Two Essays on Liquidity Suppliers\u27 Gross Profits. by Lee, Jie-haun
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1993
Two Essays on Liquidity Suppliers' Gross Profits.
Jie-haun Lee
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee, Jie-haun, "Two Essays on Liquidity Suppliers' Gross Profits." (1993). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 5580.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/5580
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UM I a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize m aterials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
University Microfilms International  
A Bell & Howell  Information C o m p a n y  
3 0 0  North Z e e b  R oad ,  Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1 3 4 6  U SA  
3 1 3 / 7 6 1 - 4 7 0 0  8 0 0 / 5 2 1 - 0 6 0 0

Order N um ber 9405406
Tw o essays on liquidity suppliers’ gross profits
Lee, Jie-Haun, Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1993
UMI
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

TWO ESSAYS ON LIQUIDITY SUPPLIERS’ GROSS PROFITS
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Interdepartmental Program in Business Administration
by
Jie-Haun Lee 
B.B.A., National Taiwan University, 1985 
M.A., University of Iowa, 1989 
August, 1993
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my appreciation to the members 
of my thesis committee, G. Geoffrey Booth, Mustafa Chowdhury, 
Tae H. Lee, and Gary Sanger, for their generous comments. 
Very special thanks go to Ji-Chai Lin, the thesis supervisor, 
for his continuing support and helpful advice throughout the 
process. I am also grateful to Paul Brockman and Bruce Grace 
for reading the manuscript.
TABLE OP CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....................................  ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS  ............................ iii
LIST OF TABLES  ....................................iv
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................ vi
A B S T R A C T ............................................... vii
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION ................................ 1
2 VOLATILITY AND LIQUIDITY AT THE OPENING CALL:
A CLOSER LOOK .................................5
2.1. Introduction .......................   . 5
2.2. Data ................................. 11
2.3. Variances at the Open and at the Close 13
2.4. Price Reve r s a l s .......................21
2.5. Implied Bid-Ask Spread ............  35
2.6. Conclusions...........................42
3 INTRADAY PATTERNS IN GROSS PROFITS
EARNED BY NYSE SPECIALISTS.................. 44
3.1. Introduction .........................44
3.2. The Empirical M o d e l .................. 49
3.3. Data ................................. 57
3.4. Evidence of an Intraday Pattern
in Gross Profits ..................... 62
3.5. Sources of Intraday Volatility . . .  72
3.6. Conclusions...........................76





2-1 Variance R a t i o s ................................... 15
2-2 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Variance Ratios . . .  20
2-3 Serial Correlations ............................. 23
2-4 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Serial Correlations 
Between the Overnight and the Following 
Daytime Returns . . . . . . . . .  ..............  28
2-4a Cross-Sectional Analysis of Serial Correlations 
Between the Overnight and the Following 
Daytime Returns .................................  29
2-4b Cross-Sectional Analysis of Serial Correlations 
Between the Overnight and the Following 
Daytime Returns .................................  30
2-5 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Serial Correlations
Between the Overnight and the Previous
Daytime Returns .................................  32
2-5a Cross-Sectional Analysis of Serial Correlations 
Between the Overnight and the Previous
Daytime Returns .................................  3 3
2-5b Cross-Sectional Analysis of Serial Correlations
Between the Overnight and the Previous 
Daytime R e t u r n s ...............................  . 34
2-6 Implied Bid-Ask Spreads ........................  38
2-7 Implied Spread Comparisons ....................  41
2-8 Comparisons of the Adverse Selection Components . 41
3-1 Intraday Patterns in Bid-Ask Spreads... .........  59
3-2 Intraday Patterns in Trading Volume
and Volatility ....................................61
3-3 Estimates of Average Quote Revisions
Due to Trades  ............................. 63
3-4 Estimates of Average Trade Price
Changes Due to Spreads ........................... 66
iv




3-1 The Intraday Pattern in the Adverse Selection
Component of the Effective Spread .............  65
3-2 The Intraday Pattern in the Gross Profit
Component of the Effective Spread .............  68
3-3 The Intraday Pattern in the Average
Gross Profit Per Share in Cents Earned
by the Specialist.................................71
3-4 The Intraday Pattern in Price Volatility
Due to Private Information Revealed from Trade . 74
3-5 The Intraday Pattern in Price Volatility 
Due to Prices Bouncing between
the Bid-Ask Spread ...............................75
vi
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the 
strategic behavior of the specialist proposed by Glosten 
(1989) and its implications for price volatility and market 
liquidity. The extant literature suggests that the bid-ask 
spread is responsible, at least in part, for the greater 
volatility and more negative autocorrelation at the open than 
at the close. We find that these phenomena are not related 
to the bid-ask spread, but related to pricing errors quoted 
by the specialist or by limit order traders around the open.
We use George, Kaul, and Nimalendran's (1991) model, 
which is less biased than Roll's (1984) model, to estimate 
the implied spread. The results show that, on average, the 
implied spread earned by liquidity suppliers is less at the 
open than at the close. These results refute Stoll and 
Whaley's (1990) contention that the specialist exploits his 
monopoly position and earns a higher profit at the opening 
call.
Glosten (1989) posits that when information asymmetry is 
high, the specialist may reduce profits or even realize 
losses to induce informed traders to trade and to release 
their information. This reduces the adverse selection 
problem and makes subsequent trades more profitable. This 
hypothesis of averaging profits through time implies that the 
pattern in the specialist's gross profits is inversely
vii
related to the pattern in information asymmetry. Since 
information asymmetry has been found to be higher at the 
beginning of the trading day, we predict that gross profits 
earned by the specialist will be lower at the beginning than 
during the rest of the trading day. Empirical results are 




In securities markets, market makers play several 
important roles such as suppliers of immediacy, information 
processors, price stabilizers, and auctioneers.1 When market 
makers provide their services to traders, they incur costs 
that include order processing cost, inventory holding cost, 
and adverse selection cost.2 Market makers charge the bid- 
ask spread to cover these market making costs.3
One of the major market structural issues is the effect 
of informational trading on liquidity of the market. The 
adverse information theory suggests that market makers widen 
the bid-ask spread to compensate for expected losses to 
informed traders when they perceive an increase in the degree 
of information asymmetry.4 However, if market makers face an 
extremely high degree of information asymmetry, will they 
quote an extremely high spread? How will they resolve the 
high degree of information asymmetry? If market makers do 
quote an extremely high spread, the market will become
■See Stoll (1985).
2See Stoll (1978, 1989).
3See Demsetz (1968) and Stoll (1989).
4See, for example, Bagehot (1971), Copeland and Galai 
(1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and O'Hara 
(1987).
illiquid and the cost of transacting will be very high.5 In 
this case, private information may not be easily released 
through trading.
Glosten (1989) suggests that the monopolist specialist 
can average profits over time. When information asymmetry is 
high, the specialist may reduce profits or even realize 
losses to induce informed traders to trade and release their 
information, thus reducing the adverse selection problem and 
making subsequent trades profitable. Hence, the specialist 
may use this strategic behavior to mitigate the adverse 
selection problem and enhance the market liquidity. Glosten
(1989) shows that this strategic behavior of the specialist's 
averaging profits over time is optimal under the condition of 
information asymmetry.
The strategic behavior of market makers is the primary 
focus of the dissertation. Specifically, this dissertation 
consists of two essays. The first essay examines whether 
greater return volatility and more negative serial 
correlation at the opening call, as documented by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990), are due to the 
bid-ask spread. Stoll and Whaley (1990) conjecture that the 
specialist, in exploiting his monopoly position at the 
opening call, increases the effective bid-ask spread. 
However, according to Glosten (1989), the specialist, who 
charges a monopoly profit at the opening call, may not be
5See, for example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988).
profit-maximizing. Instead, since the degree of information 
asymmetry is likely to be highest at the beginning of the 
trading day due to the long period of nontrading,6 the 
specialist may lower his gross profits to induce informed 
traders to submit orders and release their information at the 
open. This may mitigate the adverse selection problem at the 
opening call and make subsequent trades in continuous market 
more profitable. Hence, unlike Stoll and Whaley (1990), we 
postulate that the specialist sets a smaller cost of 
immediacy in order to encourage trading at the opening call.
The second essay examines the implication of the 
strategic behavior of the specialist in intraday patterns of 
gross profits earned by NYSE specialists. Also, this essay 
empirically distinguishes the impacts of the bid-ask spread 
and of private information on intraday return volatility. If 
the strategic behavior of the specialist follows the model of 
Glosten (1989), gross profits earned by the specialist are 
expected to be lower at the beginning than during the rest of 
the trading day. In addition, the strategic behavior of the 
specialist suggests that the impacts on price volatility of 
the bid-ask spread and of private information may vary 
through time. Since gross profits earned by market makers 
are expected to be lower at the beginning, price volatility 
due to prices bouncing between the bid-ask spread should be
6See, for example, Hasbrouck (1991) and Foster and 
Viswanathan (1993).
less at the beginning than during the rest of the trading 
day. Conversely, since information asymmetry is expected to 
be higher at the beginning, price volatility due to private 
information should be larger at the beginning than during the 
rest of the trading day.
These two essays are addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
respectively. In these two chapters, we review the 
literature, identify the problems, formulate the hypotheses 
for empirical tests, and present the results. We then 
conclude the dissertation in Chapter 4 with a discussion of 
issues for further research.
CHAPTER 2
VOLATILITY AND LIQUIDITY AT THE OPENING CALL:
A CLOSER LOOK
2.1. Introduction
Many stock exchanges, which operate as continuous 
markets, employ a call clearing procedure at the opening 
transaction.7 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is a 
typical example of this setting. Buy and sell orders are 
batched for execution at the opening call. After observing 
the accumulated buy and sell orders, the specialist may trade 
on his own account or solicit more orders from floor traders 
to offset order imbalances. With the assistance of the 
opening automated reporting system (OARS) that sorts the 
accumulated buy and sell orders, the specialist determines a 
price that clears the market. The price is applied to all 
executed buy and sell orders. In subsequent continuous 
trading, transactions are carried out through the specialist 
and other traders who quote bid and ask prices at which they 
are willing to buy or sell.8 Hence, the trading mechanism at 
the open is different from that of the rest of the day.
7Examples are the New York, American, Amsterdam, 
Brussels, Frankfurt, Luxembourg, Montreal, Paris, Tokyo, 
Toronto, and Vienna Stock Exchanges. See Cohen, Maier, 
Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1986, Ch. 2) for further discussions 
on trading systems in the main world exchange markets.
8The quoted prices may be from the specialist's own 
account or from traders who submit limit orders. Floor 
traders may also compete with the specialist for order flows.
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Several studies have compared the volatility and liquidity 
of the call market at the open with those of the continuous 
market at the close and obtained intriguing results. For 
example, Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley
(1990) find that open-to-open returns of NYSE stocks exhibit 
greater volatility and more negative autocorrelation than 
close-to-close returns. Amihud and Mendelson (1989, 1991) 
examine the behavior of stock returns generated from the 
morning opening call and the closing transaction on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE) and obtain similar results.
What may cause greater volatility and more negative 
autocorrelation at the open than at the close? Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990) suggest that the 
results are not attributable to the release of public 
information, since both the open-to-open return and the 
close-to-close return span the same time period (i.e., 24 
hours). Amihud and Mendelson (1991) further show that the 
results are not attributable to the clearing transaction 
mechanism per se, because the afternoon clearing transaction 
on the TSE does not produce greater volatility than the 
continuous market.9 They thus conclude that "the culprit in 
the higher volatility and negative autocorrelation of daily 
open-to-open returns is the preceding nontrading period ..." 
(p. 1787).
9The TSE employs a clearing mechanism in the opening 
transaction of both the morning and the afternoon trading 
sessions.
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) argue that during a long 
nontrading period traders cannot observe a sequence of recent 
transaction prices to infer the current value of the 
security. Hence, we should expect more noisy value discovery 
and larger pricing errors following the overnight trading 
halt. The larger pricing errors could lead to greater 
volatility and more negative autocorrelation at the open than 
at the close. Amihud and Mendelson (1991, p.1783) indicate 
that a simple interpretation of the relation between price 
reversals and pricing errors is due to the implicit bid-ask 
spread, as suggested by Roll (1984). Similarly, Stoll and 
Whaley (1990) contend that the specialist, in exploiting his 
monopoly position at the opening call, increases the 
effective bid-ask spread. Since transaction prices tend to 
bounce between bid and ask prices, the larger bid-ask spread 
increases the tendency of price reversals and makes prices 
more volatile at the open.
The first purpose of this study is to further examine 
whether the bid-ask spread is the main cause for higher 
volatility and more negative auto-correlation at the open. 
Using the bid price right after the opening transaction as 
the open bid, we find that open-to-open bid price returns 
also display higher volatility and more negative 
autocorrelation than close-to-close bid price returns. 
Furthermore, the transaction price reversal around the open 
is, to a large extent, related to the reversal in bid prices.
Since returns based on bid prices are not subject to bid-ask 
spread bounces, these findings cast doubts on the notion that 
the bid-ask spread is the main cause for greater volatility 
and more price reversals at the open than at the close.
We posit that informed trading around the opening causes 
bid prices to reverse. It is possible that new information 
is produced and accumulated during the overnight trading 
halt. All of the new private information may not be 
incorporated into prices at the opening call. (According to 
Kyle's (1985, p.1319) model, only one-half of the insider's 
private information is incorporated into prices through a 
single call auction.)10 Hence, liquidity suppliers who quote 
bid and ask prices immediately after the opening call are 
still likely to face informed traders with private 
information. If the bid price at which liquidity suppliers 
are willing to buy is too high, informed traders sell and 
bring down the bid price later on. If the bid price is too 
low, informed traders could profit by setting a limit order 
with a slightly higher bid to buy. Thus, informed trading 
around the open could correct pricing errors quoted by the 
specialist or by limit order traders, resulting in the bid
10Certainly, Kyle's (1985) model is derived under certain 
assumptions, which may not perfectly fit in with the NYSE. 
For example, informed traders can be market makers by 
submitting limit orders on the NYSE. Also, the quantity 
traded by noise traders may not follow a Brownian motion 
process. Hence, the proportion of private information 
incorporated into prices at the opening call on the NYSE may 
deviate from his prediction.
price reversal. Informed trading could similarly cause ask 
prices to reverse. The reversal in the bid and ask prices 
could lead to a reversal in transaction prices, which in turn 
could increase the volatility of open-to-open returns 
relative to close-to-close returns.
Although the specialist and limit order traders may lose 
to informed traders around the open, they may gain from 
liquidity traders in subsequent trades. Hence, the second 
purpose of this study is to examine the strategic behavior of 
the specialist at the opening call. Stoll and Whaley (1990) 
argue that the specialist charges a higher cost of immediacy 
and earns a monopoly profit at the open. Their estimated 
cost of immediacy at the open is about nine times as much as 
at the close.11 As argued below, the specialist who charges 
a monopoly profit at the opening call may not be profit- 
maximizing.
Unlike Stoll and Whaley (1990), we postulate that the 
specialist encourages trading by setting a smaller cost of 
immediacy at the opening call. More trading would reveal 
more private information (about the value of the security),12
"Their estimates indicate that the average implied 
spread is 0.8983 percent if based on open-to-open returns, 
whereas it is only 0.0971 percent if based on close-to-close 
returns.
"According to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), the lower 
cost of immediacy can attract more discretionary liquidity 
traders. The concentration of liquidity trading induces more 
informed trading, which may release more information about 
the value of the security.
10
which has been accumulated since the closing transaction on 
the previous day. From learning at the opening call, the 
specialist reduces the adverse selection problem and makes 
subsequent trades in the continuous market more profitable.
This strategic behavior of the specialist at the opening 
call and at the continuous trading market follows the model 
of Glosten (1989). He suggests that the monopolist 
specialist can learn some of the information of the informed 
and can average profits over time. That is, the greater 
profits earned after a decrease in the information asymmetry 
offset the losses realized early on in the trading when the 
adverse selection problem was high. Certainly, the 
specialist on the NYSE is not a pure monopolist and hence his 
ability to average losses and profits over time may be 
limited. Nevertheless, the specialist has strong incentives 
to reduce the expected losses to informed traders for his own 
account and for limit order traders' accounts. As noted by 
Stoll and Whaley (1990, footnote 2), on average, the 
specialist participates in about 90 percent of the nonblock 
shares traded on the NYSE as either dealer for his own 
account or broker for the limit order book.
Without a call clearing at the open, the specialist 
could still learn from the informed in the continuous market. 
However, as shown by Madhavan (1992, p. 609), a periodic call 
market aggregates information more efficiently and is more 
robust to the problem of information asymmetry in that it
1 1
could operate where a continuous market might fail. This may 
explain why most of exchanges with continuous trading adopt 
a periodic call procedure at the beginning of the trading day 
when the information asymmetry is likely to be highest.
The hypothesized strategic behavior of the specialist on 
the call market and the continuous market implies that the 
cost of immediacy is lower at the opening transaction than at 
the closing transaction. We test this hypothesis using 
George, Kaul, and Nimalendran's (GKN, 1991) approach to 
estimate the cost of immediacy. Their approach, which takes 
into consideration autocorrelations in expected returns, is 
less biased than Roll's (1984) model, which was used by Stoll 
and Whaley (1990).
2.2. Data
Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990) 
note that actively traded stocks are more likely to open
using the call clearing procedure. Hence, to compare the
volatility and liquidity of the call market at the open with 
those of the continuous market at the close, we select a 
sample of 452 actively traded common stocks. These stocks 
were (1) included in the Standard and Poor's 500 index, (2) 
listed on the NYSE, and (3) traded at a share price of no
less than $3 at any time during 1991.13
13Among the S&P 500 stocks, 457 stocks were listed on the 
NYSE. Five out of the 457 stocks were traded at a share 
price of less than $3 and discarded from our sample. The
12
We focus on opening and closing trades and quotes 
originated on the NYSE. On each trading day, we obtain the 
opening and closing transaction price and trading volume from 
the 1991 ISSM (the Institute for the Study of the Security 
Markets) files.14 The opening bid and ask prices, which are 
the quotes immediately following the opening transaction, are 
also obtained from the ISSM files, along with the closing bid 
and ask prices. When computing stock returns, we adjust the 
prices for cash dividends, stock splits, and stock dividends. 
These distributions are obtained from the 1991 CRSP (the 
Center for Research in Security Prices) files.
Specifically, the open-to-open and close-to-close 
transaction price returns on day t, PRot and PRct, are computed 
as
P R o,t =  iog(Po,t+ D i) “  l o g ( p o,u)> a n d
PRc,t = iog(pc,i+Dt) - iogtPc.n)/
where Pot and Pct are the day-t opening and closing transaction 
prices, adjusted for splits and stock dividends, and Dt is the 
cash dividend if t is an ex-dividend day, and zero otherwise.
ticker symbols of these five stocks are BLY, IK, NAV, UIS, 
and VAT.
14The ISSM develops error filters to flag a price or 
quote that is suspected of being incorrect. For example, if 
a stock traded around $40.0, an observed price of $4.0 would 
be flagged as a recording error. We discard from the sample 
any observation that is flagged as an error.
13
The open-to-open and close-to-close bid returns on day t, BRot
and BR..J, are similarly calculated.
2.3. Variances at the Open and at the Close
In this section we extend Amihud and Mendelson's (1987) 
and Stoll and Whaley's (1990) analysis of open-to-open and 
close-to-close transaction price returns to returns based on 
quoted bid and ask prices. The advantage of using returns 
based on the bid price (or ask price) is that we can minimize 
the effect of bid-ask spread bounces on return variances. If 
the "true" variances at the open and at the close are the 
same, we should expect that the variance of open-to-open bid 
price returns is equal to the variance of close-to-close bid 
price returns. Alternatively, if we observe that the 
variance of open-to-open bid price returns is larger than the 
variance of close-to-close bid price returns, then factors 
other than the bid-ask spread bounce are responsible for the 
difference in variances of bid price returns.
Following Stoll and Whaley (1990), we first calculate 
variances of open-to-open returns and close-to-close returns 
for each sample stock in each month in 1991. Next, the ratio 
of the return variances is computed in each month, and then 
averaged over the 12 months for each stock.15 Table 2-1
15This procedure is slightly different from that used by 
Stoll and Whaley (1990) . They compute the mean variance 
ratio by first averaging across all stocks in the sample and 
then averaging across the 60 months in the five-year sample
14
reports summary statistics of the average variance ratios 
across the sample stocks.
Panel A of Table 2-1 contains results based on 
transaction prices, with Panels B and C based on bid and ask 
prices, respectively. In addition to results for the full 
sample, we also report results for three subsamples, which 
are grouped by the average daily dollar volume in 1991. 
Since results for the subsamples are quite similar to those 
of the full sample, we focus our discussion on the full 
sample.
The mean open-to-open/close-to-close variance ratio 
based on transaction prices is 1.0939. This result suggests 
that open-to-open returns tend to be more volatile than 
close-to-close returns. The standard error of the ratio, as 
reported below the mean variance ratio, indicates that the 
mean variance ratio is significantly larger than one, 
consistent with previous studies.16 However, the magnitude
period. Hence, their test statistics are based on the 
distribution of the 60 monthly average values. Two reasons 
for the difference. First, we have only one year data. 
Second, our procedure is more appropriate for cross-sectional 
analysis, which is an important part of our study. 
Nevertheless, we tried both procedures and obtain very 
similar mean variance ratios.
16Based on Lo and Mackinlay (1988), open-to-open and 
close-to-close return variances are approximately normally 
distributed. Hence, open-to-open/close-to-close variance 
ratios for sample stocks should be also approximately 
normally distributed. The standard t-test can be used to 




This table contains the mean and median ratios of variances 
of open-to-open returns relative to close-to-close returns, 
and mean and median differences of variances for 452 NYSE 
stocks in the sample. These results are also reported for 
three subsamples grouped by the average daily dollar volume 
in 1991. Panel A contains results based on transaction 
prices, Panels B and C based on bid and ask prices, 
respectively.
Bv averaee dai l v  dollar volume
All Low M e d i u m High
452 stocks 150 stocks 151 stocks 151 stocks
Panel A: Transaction Price
M e a n  v a r i a n c e  ratio3 1.0939 1.0935 1.0850 1.1031
S t a n d a r d  error of ratiob 0.0053 0.0091 0.0094 0.0092
M e d i a n  variance ratio3 1.0854 1.0327 1.0785 1.0920
M e a n  difference of v a r i a n c e 3 0.1800 0.1500 0.1600 0.2200
(x 10,000)
S t a n d a r d  error of difference11 0.0237 0.0459 0.0404 0.0362
(x 10,000)
M e d i a n  difference of v a r i a n c e 3 0.3900 0.09S1 0.0849 0.1800
(x 10,000)
Panel B: Bid Price
M e a n  v a r i a n c e  ratio 1.1678 1.1864 1.1520 1.1668
S t a n d a r d  error of ratio 0.0064 0.0124 0.0101 0.0104
M e d i a n  v a riance ratio 1.1550 1.1708 1.1442 1.1556
M e a n  difference of variance 0.4000 0.4600 0.3700 0.3900
(x 10,000)
S t a n d a r d  error of difference 0.0277 0.0570 0.0419 0.0438
(x 10,000)
M e d i a n  difference of variance 0.3000 0.3600 0.2700 0.2700
(x 10,000)
aFor each stock, the variance ratio is calculated in each month, and then 
a v e r a g e d  over the 12 months in 1991. The mean v a r i a n c e  ratios are obtained by 
a v e r a g i n g  across all stocks in the sample and all stocks w i t h i n  each average 
d a i l y  dollar volume group. The mean differences b e t w e e n  the variances of open- 
to- o p e n  returns and the variances of close-to-close returns for all stocks in the 
sample and all stocks w i t h i n  each volume group are similarly obcained.
bThe sta n d a r d  errors are based on the distributions of the average values for all 
stocks in the sample and all stocks within each volume group.
TABLE 2-1 (CONTINUED)
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Panel C: Ask Price
M e a n  v a r i a n c e  ratio* 1.1650 1.1789 1.1511 1.1652
S t a n d a r d  error of ratiob 0.0063 0.0114 0.0099 0.0111
M e d i a n  v a r i a n c e  ratio3 1.1439 1.1553 1.1402 1.1404
M e a n  differ e n c e  of v a r i a n c e 3 0.4000 0.4500 0.3700 0.3800
(x 10,000)
S t a n d a r d  error of difference13 0.0268 0.0525 0.0430 0.0432
(x 10,000)
M e d i a n  difference of variance 3 0.2800 0.3200 0.2800 0.2600
(x 10,000)
3For each stock, the variance ratio is calculated in each month, and then 
a v e r a g e d  over the 12 months in 1991. The mean v a r i a n c e  ratios are obtained by 
av e r a g i n g  across all stocks in the sample and all stocks w i t h i n  each average 
dai l v  dollar volume group. The mean differences b e t w e e n  the variances of open- 
to- o p e n  returns and the variances of close-to-close returns for all stocks in the 
sample and all stocks wit h i n  each volume group are si m i l a r l y  obtained.
bThe sta n d a r d  errors are b a s e d  on the distributions of the average values for all 
stocks in the sample and all stocks within each v o l u m e  group.
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is slightly smaller than the value of 1.1329 reported by 
Stoll and Whaley (1990) and 1.2 reported by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987). Although the differences might be due to 
different sample firms,17 we conjecture that the recent 
improvements in the efficiency of order processing on the 
NYSE, especially after the 1987 market crash, might also be 
a factor.
The mean variance ratio based on bid prices is 1.1678, 
and is 1.1650 based on ask prices. Both are significantly 
greater than one. These results imply that the open-to-open 
return volatility is larger than the close-to-close return 
volatility, even without the confounding effect of bid-ask 
spread bounce. In fact, the bid-ask spread bounce tends to 
dampen the difference in volatility at the open and at the 
close, since the mean variance ratio based on transaction 
prices is smaller than the mean variance ratio based on bid 
prices or ask prices. This is also evident from the mean 
difference between the open-to-open and the close-to-close 
variances. The mean difference in variances based on 
transaction prices is smaller than that based on bid prices 
or ask prices. In sum, Table 2-1 provides the first evidence 
that the greater volatility at the open than at the close may 
not be attributable to the bid-ask spread.
17Amihud and Mendelson (1987) examine the 3 0 Dow Jones 
Industrial Average stocks over the period February 1982 
through February 1983. Stoll and Whaley (1990) examine 1,374 
NYSE stocks during the five-year period 1982-1986.
18
To see to what extent the variance ratio of transaction 
price returns is related to the variance ratio of bid price 
returns, we conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis 
with the variance ratio of bid price returns as an 
explanatory variable. In the analysis, we also include as an 
explanatory variable the ratio of the average quoted bid-ask 
spread at the open relative to the average quoted bid-ask 
spread at the close. Mclnish and Wood (1992) show that the 
quoted bid-ask spread tends to be larger at the beginning of 
the trading day than during the rest of the trading day. In 
our sample, the ratio of the average spread at the open 
relative to the average spread at the close is about 1.196. 
Since transaction prices tend to move between the bid and the 
ask, the larger spread at the open may induce greater 
volatility at the open.
The regression model is
tf2(PRi,o) <72(BRi,„) SPjo
-----------  = a0 + aj   + a2------ + e;, (1)
tf2(PRi,c) <72(BRj>c) SPi>c
where "i" indexes firm i, and "o" and "c" index at the open
and at the close; "PR" is the transaction price return, "BR"
is the bid price return, and "SP" is the quoted bid-ask 
spread. With eq.(1), we test two null hypotheses. First, 
Hc: a^O, i.e., the greater variance of transaction price
returns at the open is not related to the greater variance of 
bid price returns at the open. Second, H0: a2=0, i.e., the
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greater variance of transaction price returns at the open is 
not attributable to the larger spread at the open. Table 2-2 
contains the regression results.
According to Table 2-2, the variance ratio of 
transaction price returns is significantly related to the 
variance ratio of bid price returns, but is insignificantly 
related to the ratio of quoted spreads. The results are 
quite consistent across the three subsamples grouped by the 
average daily dollar volume. For the whole sample, the R2 of 
the regression is 0.53, suggesting that the greater 
transaction price volatility at the open is, to a large 
extent, explainable by the greater bid price volatility at 
the open.18
Why are bid prices more volatile at the open than at the 
close? Hasbrouck (1991a) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) 
show that trades at the beginning of the trading day tend to 
convey more information and move quote prices more. This 
suggests that the degree of information asymmetries between 
market makers and informed traders is greater at the open 
than at the close. Therefore, analogous to Amihud and 
Mendelson's (1991) arguments, pricing errors quoted by the 
specialist or by limit order traders are likely to be larger 
at the open than at the close, which could lead to a 
difference in volatility.
18The results are very similar when ask prices are used 
in place of bid prices in the regressions.
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TABLE 2-2
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RATIOS
This table contains cross-sectional regressions of average 
ratios of variance of open-to-open returns relative to close- 
to-close returns based on transaction prices on those based 
on bid prices and average ratios of opening quoted bid-ask 
spread relative to closing quoted bid-ask spread.* The 
regression model is
ff2(PRi,0) (BRj,0) SPj 0
-----------=a0+ai-----------+a2-------  +ei- U)
<*2(PRi,c) <J2(BRi,c) SPijC
( t - s tatistics are in parentheses).





M e d i u m  High 
151 stocks 151 stocks
a<) 0.3034 0.4432 0.2313 0.1739
(4.76) (3.68) (2.04) (1.89)
a i 0.6070 0.4813 0.6791 0.7254
(22.52) (10.47) (13.21) (17.61)
0.0674 0.0665 0.0587 0.0681
(1.43) (0.72) (0.68) (1.08)
R z 0.5340 0.4328 0.5502 0.6772
aFor each stock, the variance ratio is calculated in each month, and then 
a v e r a g e d  over the 12 months in 1991. The b i d - a s k  spre a d  ratio is similarly 
c alculated. The bid - a s k  spread is the relative spread c o m p u t e d  as 
(ask-bid)/((ask+bid)/2) .
P R i 0  =• the o p e n-to-open return for stock i b a s e d  on t r a n s a c t i o n  price.
PR-i>c —  the close-to-close return for stock i b a s e d  on t r a n s a c t i o n  price.
B R i 0  —  the o p e n-to-open return for stock i b a s e d  on b i d  price.
B R i c  -  the close-to-close return for stock i b a s e d  on b i d  price.
S P i o  -  the quoted spread for stock i at the open.
S P ii= - the quoted spread for stock i at the close.
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2.4. Price Reversals
Stoll and Whaley (1990, p.56) show that "... prices 
established at the open tend to be reversed during the rest 
of the day, .... To the extent the specialist is an important 
provider of liquidity at the open, he benefits from the price 
reversals." If the price reversals are attributable to 
transaction prices bouncing between the bid-ask spread, then 
Stoll and Whaley's argument may be valid. However, if the 
transaction price reversals are due to bid price reversals, 
then liquidity suppliers (the specialist and limit order 
traders) may not benefit from the price reversals. To the 
extent that the bid price reversals are caused by pricing 
errors quoted by liquidity suppliers around the open, the 
price reversals may reflect liquidity suppliers' losses to 
informed traders. Therefore, the implications are quite 
different, depending on what really causes the transaction 
price reversals.
To analyze the causes of price reversals, we examine 
serial correlations between the overnight transaction price 
return, PRnit, and the following daytime transaction price 
return, PRd)t. These returns are computed as
PR„jt = log(Pol+Dt) - log(Pc>trl), and 
PRd>l = log (Pc>t) - log (Pod) .
The correlation between the overnight bid price return, BR„t, 
and the daytime bid price return, BR^, are also examined.
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These bid price returns are computed in the same manner as
the transaction price returns.
Unlike the transaction price returns, the bid price 
returns do not include the bid-ask spread bounce. Hence, GKN 
(1991) suggest that the transaction price return due to the 
bid-ask spread bounce can be extracted from the difference 
between the transaction price return and the bid price 
return. Following their suggestion, we measure the overnight 
and daytime transaction price returns due to the bid-ask 
spread bounce as
RDn, = PR,,,, - BR^, and
RDjt ~ PBjt — BRd,.
Table 2-3 reports autocorrelations for these three 
series of returns. Similar to Stoll and Whaley's (1990) 
results, we find that the overnight transaction price return 
and the following daytime transaction price return are 
negatively correlated. For the full sample, the mean 
correlation is -0.0334, which is significantly different from 
zero. Although the magnitude is small, these results do 
suggest that the opening prices tend to be reversed during 
the day.
Furthermore, we also observe reversals in bid price 




This table contains the mean and median serial correlations 
of returns in adjacent periods for 452 NYSE stocks in the 
sample and all stocks within the three average daily dollar 
volume groups in 1991. Panel A reports results based on 
transaction price returns, Panels B based on bid price 
returns, and Panel C based on transaction price returns due 
to bid-ask spread bounces, which are computed as differences 
between transaction price returns and bid price returns.









Panel A: Transaction Price
?Rd,L)
M e a n 3 -0.0334 -0.0576 -O'. 0229 -0.0199
S t a n d a r d  error3 0.0041 • 0.0075 0.0069 0.0062
M e d i a n 3 -0.0287 -0.0522 -0 .0192 -0.0232
p ( ? R d,-.,,
M e a n -0.0064 -0.0338 -0.0050 0.0195
S t a n d a r d  error 0.0045 0.0079 0 .0076 0.0070
M e d i a n -0.0039 -0.0337 -0.0040 0.0231
p(??., . PR,.,)
M e a n -0.0336 -0.0536 -0.0175 -0.0448
Sta n d a r d  error 0.0038 0.0069 0.0063 0.0063
M e d i a n -0.0449 -0.0626 -0.0292 -0.0352
pCPSh...!, PR-,-)
M e a n -0.0058 -0.0313 0 .0169 -0.002S
S tandard error 0.0041 0.0076 0.0068 0.0061
M e d i a n -0.0039 -0.0373 0.0216 -0.0026
aT o r  each stock, che serial correlation is calculated in each cionch, and then 
a v eraged over the 12 monchs in 1991. The mean serial correlations are obcained 
b y  averaging across all stocks in the sample ar.d ail stocks within each average 
d a ily dollar volume group.
•’T h e  standard errors are based on the discribucions or the average values tor all 







— the overnight recurn at day t based on transaction price.
— che daytime recurn ac day t based on transaction price.
— che daytime recurn ac day c based on transaction price.
— the open-co-open recurn ac day c-1 based on transaction price.
— the open-to-open recurn at day c based on transaction price.
— the close - Co-close recurn at day c-1 based on transaction price.
— the close-co-close recurn ac day t based on transaction price.
TABLE 2-3 (CONTINUED)
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Panel B: Bid Price
pCBRn.-i BR<jit)
M e a n 3 - 0 . 0581 - 0 . 0 8 8 7 - 0 . 0 4 1 0 - 0 . 0 4 5 0
S t a n d a r d  e r rorb 0. 0042 0 . 0 0 8 0 0 . 0 0 6 5 0. 0065
M e d i a n 3 -0 . 0505 - 0 . 0 9 4 1 - 0 . 0 2 9 4 - 0 . 0 4 6 1
P (BRd, i - i , BRn.t)
M e a n 0. 0330 0 . 0 0 6 5 0 . 0 3 7 5 0. 0548
S t a n d a r d  error 0. 0041 0 . 00 7 7 0 . 0 0 6 7 0. 0065
M e d i a n 0. 0323 0 . 01 1 6 0 . 0 3 1 9 0. 0507
P (BR0, t - i , BRo.t)
M e a n -0 . 0351 - 0 . 0 4 7 2 - 0 . 0 1 4 0 - 0 . 0 4 4 1
S t a n d a r d  error 0. 0037 0 . 0 0 6 7 0 . 0 0 6 1 0 . 0062
M e d i a n - 0 . 0361 - 0 . 0 4 8 3 - 0 . 0 2 0 6 - 0 . 0 4 0 1
pCBR. ...!, B R eit)
M e a n 0. 0195 - 0 . 0 0 2 5 0 . 0 3 9 7 0 . 0213
S t a n d a r d  error 0. 0037 0 . 00 6 6 0 . 0 0 6 3 0 . 0057
M e d i a n 0.0166 - 0 . 0 0 5 1 0 . 04 0 7 0 . 0178
aFor each stock, the serial correlation is c a l c u l a t e d  in each month, and then 
a v e r a g e d  over che 12 months in 1991. The m e a n  serial correl a t i o n s  are obtained 
b y  a v e r a g i n g  across all stocks in the sample and all stocks w i t h i n  each average 
d a i l y  dol l a r  volume group.
bThe s t a n d a r d  errors are b a s e d  on the distributions of the average values for all 
stocks in the sample and all stocks within each vol u m e  group.
BRj, * - the overnight return at day t b a s e d  on b i d  price.
BR d t  - the daytime return at day t b a sed on b i d  price.
BRj t.! - the daytime return at day t based on b i d  price.
BR^_ t -  the open-to-open recurn ac day t-1 b a s e d  on b i d  price.
B R j j - the open-to-open return at day t b a s e d  on b i d  price.
B R e t-i, - the close-to-close return at day t-1 b a s e d  on b i d  price.
B R c t - the close-to-close return at day t b a s e d  on b i d  price.
TABLE 2-3 (CONTINUED)
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Panel C: Returns due to the b i d - a s k s p r e a d 0
P(RDn,t. R^d.t)
M e a n 3 -0.3532 -0.3838 -0.3720 -0.3041
S t a n d a r d e r r o r b 0.0045 0.0071 0.0066 0.0080
M e d i a n 3 -0.3607 -0.3860 -0.3838 -0.2980
p(RD RD*,t)
M e a n -0.5699 -0.5325 -0.5482 -0.6288
S t a n d a r d e rror 0.0046 0.0071 0.0069 0.0077
M e d i a n -0.5723 -0.5416 -0.5373 -0.6308
p ( R D Si-.-i, R D ai6)
M e a n -0.4684 -0.4713 -0.4634 -0.4706
S t a n d a r d error 0.0021 0.0040 0.0034 0.0034
M e d i a n -0.4681 -0.4730 -0.4605 -0.4718
P (RDt.t-l . RDc.-J
M e a n -0.4749 -0.4743 0.4788 -0.4717
S t a n d a r d error 0.0022 0.0040 0.0033 0.0039
M e d i a n -0.4777 -0.4790 -0.4806 -0.4737
aFor each stock, the serial correlation is c a l c u l a t e d  in each month, and then 
a v e r a g e d  over the 12 months in 1991. The m e a n  serial c o rrelations are obtained 
b y  a v e r a g i n g  across all stocks in the sample and all stocks w i t h i n  each average 
d a i l y  d o l l a r  volume group.
bT h e  s t a n d a r d  errors are b a s e d  on the distributions of the average values for all 
stocks in the sample and all stocks within each v o l u m e  group.
°The t r a n s a c t i o n  price return due to the b i d - a s k  s p r e a d  is defined as the 
d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  the return based on t r a n s a c t i o n  prices and the recurn based 
on b i d  pric e s  [see GKN (1991)].
RDn . RRn, t" BR-i, t •
RDd!*. - B R - d , t ' BR d ,f
R ° d , t - 1 - RRd. t- i -BR-d. t - i
. t - i - RRo, t - i  ■ BRo. t - i
RDo. t - P R o . t ' B R 0 , t  ■
R D c . t - i - R R c , t - i ' B R c , t - i
RD=.t - PRc>t - B R C | t .
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the overnight and the following daytime bid price returns is 
-0.0581, which is also significantly different from zero. 
Bid prices are the prices that liquidity suppliers are 
willing to pay for the security. The negative correlation 
implies that bid prices quoted by liquidity suppliers 
following the opening transaction tend to be too high or too 
low. The largest negative correlation occurs in the low 
trading volume group, suggesting that pricing errors are more 
likely to occur in thinly traded stocks. The pricing errors 
ought to be subsequently corrected through trading by the 
informed, resulting in bid price reversals. These reversals 
could lead to transaction price reversals.
The reversals in transaction price could also be related 
to the bid-ask spread bounce. As shown in Panel C of 
Table 2-3, the mean correlation between the overnight and the 
following daytime transaction price returns due to the bid- 
ask spread bounce, RDnt and RDdt, is -0.3532. This magnitude 
of reversals is much larger than those of reversals in bid 
price returns and reversals in transaction price returns, as 
mentioned above.
To examine what really causes transaction price 
reversals, we rely on cross-sectional regression analysis. 
The regression equation is
p(PRi,n, PRiid) = b0 + b, p (BRin, BR;d) + b2 p (RDin, RDi>d) + Ui, (2)
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With eq. (2) , we test two null hypotheses. First, H0: bi=0, 
i.e., the opening transaction price reversals are not related 
to the bid price reversals. Second, H0: b2=0, i.e., the
opening transaction price reversals are not related to the 
bid-ask spread bounce. Table 2-4 reports the regression 
results.
According to Table 2-4, the null hypothesis that b2=0 
cannot be rejected in all four regressions: one for the full 
sample and three for the three subsamples. Since the 
reversals are not related to the bid-ask spread, the results 
imply that liquidity suppliers do not benefit from the 
opening transaction price reversals.
Conversely, we can easily reject the null hypothesis 
that b,=0 in all four regressions. The results indicate that 
the stronger the bid price reversal, the stronger the 
transaction price reversal. This relation allows us to infer 
that pricing errors quoted by liquidity suppliers around the 
open are the main source of the opening transaction price 
reversals. Instead of benefiting from the reversals, as 
suggested by Stoll and Whaley (1990), it appears that the 
reversals may reflect liquidity suppliers' losses to informed 
traders.
While the overnight and the following daytime bid price 
returns, BR„t and BRdt, tend to be negatively correlated, the 
overnight and the previous daytime bid price returns, BR„t and 
BRd , tend to be positively correlated, as shown in
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TABLE 2-4
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SERIAL CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN THE OVERNIGHT AND THE FOLLOWING DAYTIME RETURNS
This table contains results of cross-sectional regressions of 
the correlations between the overnight and following daytime 
returns based on transaction prices on those based on bid 
prices and the correlations between the overnight and 
following daytime transaction price returns due to bid-ask 
spread bounces.8 The model is
p( PRi,n/ PR^bo+b^BR^, BR^+b^RD^, RD^+U;. (2)
(t - s t a t i s t i c s  are in parentheses).









b 0 0.0197 0.0261 0.0287 0.0085
(2.25) (1.32) (1.39) (0.89)
bi 0.8004 0.7604 0.8170 0.8477
(30.59) (16.58) (14.71) (22.58)
b 2 0.0186 0.0425 0.0487 -0.0317
(0.77) (0.83) (0.89) (-1.05)
R 2 0.6843 0.6659 0.6006 0.7795
aFor e ach stock, the correlation between the ov e r n i g h t  returns and the following 
d aytime returns is calculated in each month, and then a v e r a g e d  over the 12 months 
in 1991. The transaction price recurn due to the b i d - a s k  spread is defined as 
che di f f e r e n c e  between the return based on t r a n s a c t i o n  prices and che return 
b a s e d  o n  b i d  prices [see GKN (1991)].
PR,: ^ = che overnight return for stock i b a s e d  on t r a n s a c t i o n  price.
PRi d => the following daytime return for stock i b a s e d  on transaction price.
BRi n =■ the overnight return for stock i b a s e d  on b i d  price.
BR, d -  the following daytime return for stock i b a s e d  on b i d  price.




CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SERIAL CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN THE OVERNIGHT AND THE FOLLOWING DAYTIME RETURNS
This table contains results of cross-sectional regressions of 
the correlation between the overnight and following daytime 
returns based on transaction prices on those based on bid 
p r i c e s T h e  model is
p(PRs.n, PRj.d) =b0' +bj' p  (BRj n ,
( t - statistics are in parentheses).
BRi,d) +/V
By average d a i l y  dollar volume
All Low M e d i u m High
452 stocks 150 stocks 151 stocks 151 stocks
V 0.0133 0.0105 0.0108 0.0180
(4.87) (1.78) (2.19) (5.35)
b, ’ 0.8039 0.7680 0.8222 0.8441
(31.20) (17.11) (14.90) (22.84)
R 2 0.6838 0.6620 0.5985 0.7778
aFor e a c h  stock, che c orrelation between the overnight returns and the following 
d a y t i m e  returns is c a l c u l a t e d  in each month, and then a v e r a g e d  over the 12 months
in 1991.
P R i n =■ the overnight return for stock i b a sed on t r a n s a c t i o n  price.
P R d d = the following daytime return for stock i b a s e d  on transa c t i o n  price.
B R i n  = the overnight retu r n  for stock i b a s e d  on b i d  price.
BR^ d => the following daytime return for stock i b a s e d  o n  b i d  price.
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TABLE 2-4b
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SERIAL CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN THE OVERNIGHT AND THE FOLLOWING DAYTIME RETURNS
This table contains results of cross-sectional regressions of 
the correlation between the overnight and following daytime 
returns based on transaction prices on the correlations 
between the overnight and following daytime transaction price 
returns due to bid-ask spread bounces.* The model is
p(PRiin, PRi,d)=b0"+b2"p(RDi>I1/ RDid) +£;.
( t - statistics are in parentheses).









b 0 ” 0.0180 0.0245 0.0269 -0.0105
(1.18) (0.73) (0.83) (-0.52)
^ 2" 0.1457 0.2140 0.1341 0.0308
(3.48) (2.51) (1.58) (0.49)
R 2 0.0261 0.0409 0.01 6 4 0.0016
aFor e a c h  stock, the correl a t i o n  between the o v e r n i g h t  returns and the following 
day t i m e  returns is c a l c ulated in each month, and t hen a v e r a g e d  over the 12 months 
in 1991. The transaction price return due to the b i d - a s k  s p r e a d  is defined as 
the d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  the return based on t r a n s a c t i o n  prices and che return 
b a s e d  on b i d  prices [see GKN (1991)].
PR t n —  the overnight return for stock i based on t r a n s a c t i o n  price.
PR.- d — the following daytime return for stock i b a s e d  o n  t ransaction price.
RD̂ a “ P*i,n-BRi,n- 
R D iid -  P R i d-BRi(d.
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Table 2-3. For the full sample, the mean correlation between 
BR„t and BRdn is 0.03 3, suggesting a bid price continuation. 
As noted by Stoll and Whaley (1990, footnote 21), "One 
explanation for price continuations suggested by William 
Splitz is the pecking-order theory of research 
recommendations, which implies that favored clients receive 
recommendations before the general public." The bid price 
continuations could also reflect a partial adjustment of bid 
prices to information as suggested by Goldman and Beja (1979) 
and Hasbrouck and Ho (1987) ,19
This pattern of bid price continuations also have a 
significant effect on the transaction price behavior during 
the same time period, as reported in Table 2-5. The results 
may explain why the daytime transaction price return is less 
likely to be reversed in the following night. The results 
may also refute Stoll and Whaley's (1990, p. 54) argument 
that the price continuations around the closing imply that 
the closing transaction price is less likely to reflect the 
bid-ask spread bounce.
It is worth mentioning that price reversals around the 
open are not a result of the price continuations from the 
daytime into the following night. As shown in Table 2-3, the 
largest price reversal around the open occurs in the low
19In particular, Hasbrouck and Ho (1987) suggest that 
because of costs of placing and canceling limit orders, we 




CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SERIAL CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN THE OVERNIGHT AND THE PREVIOUS DAYTIME RETURNS
This table contains results of cross-sectional regressions of 
the correlations between the previous daytime and overnight 
returns based on transaction prices on those based on bid 
prices and the correlations between the previous daytime and 
overnight transaction price returns due to bid-ask spread 
bounces.* The model is
P (PRj,d-l> P-̂ i.n) = C 0+ C lP (BRi,d-l/ ®^i,n) + C 2P (R^i.d-l ' RD; n) +  £;.
(t - s t a t i s t i c s  are in parentheses).









Co -0.04328 -0.0504 -0.0351 -0.0127
(-3.01) (-1.77) (-1.26) (-0.48)
C 1 0.9031 0.8449 0.9503 0.9024
(32.14) (17.25) (18.33) (18.60)
c 2 -0.0124 -0.0207 0.0102 0.0276
(-0.49) (-0.39) (0.20) (0.67)
R 2 0.7028 0.6760 0.6962 0.7014
aFor e a c h  stock, the correlation between the pre v i o u s  daytime returns and the 
o v e r n i g h t  returns is calculated in each month, and then ave r a g e d  over the 12 
mon t h s  in 1991. The transaction price return due to the b i d - a s k  spread is 
d e f i n e d  as the difference between the return b a s e d  on t r a n s a c t i o n  prices and the 
r e t u r n  b a s e d  on bid prices [see GKN (1991)].
P R i n  - the overnight return for stock i b a s e d  on t r a n s a c t i o n  price.
PR-i.d-i ” che previous daytime return for stock i b a s e d  o n  transaction price.
B R i n  - the overnight return for stock i b a s e d  on b i d  price.
“ the previous daycime return for stock i b a s e d  o n  bid price.
R-Di.n ”  PRi , n ' BRi ,n-
B ^ i . d - 1  -  P R i , d - i - B R i , d - l -
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TABLE 2-5a
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SERIAL CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN THE OVERNIGHT AND THE PREVIOUS DAYTIME RETURNS
This table contains results of cross-sectional regressions of 
the correlations between the previous daytime and overnight 
returns based on transaction prices on those based on bid 
prices.1 The model is
P  (P̂ i,d-l i PRi,n)=c0'+c1'p (BRid.,, BIU+V;.
(t - s tatistics are in p a r e n t h e s e s ) .
By average daily dollar volume
All Small M e d i a n Large
452 stocks 150 stocks 151 stocks 151 stocks
co' -0.0363 -0.0394 -0.0406 -0.0301
(-13.98) (-8.69) (-8.75) (-6.45)
ci' 0.9052 0.8478 0.9492 0.9035
(32.61) (17.56) ( I S .48) (18.67)
R 2 0.7027 0.6757 0.6961 0.7005
aFor e a c h  stock, the correlation between the previous daytime returns and the
o v e r n i g h t  returns is calculated in each month, and then ave r a g e d  over the 12 
months in 1991.
P R t n — the overnight return for stock i based on transa c t i o n  price.
P^i.d-i — c^ e previous daytime return for stock i b a s e d  on transaction price.
B R i n  - the overnight return for stock i based on b i d  price.
BRi d_j_ - the previous daytime return for stock i b a s e d  on b i d  price.
Table 2-5b
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SERIAL CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN THE OVERNIGHT AND THE PREVIOUS DAYTIME RETURNS
This table contains results of cross-sectional regressions of 
the correlations between the previous daytime and overnight 
returns based on transaction prices on the correlations 
between the previous daytime and overnight transaction price 
returns due to bid-ask spread bounces.® The model is
p (PR^j, PRi,n) =c0"+c2"p (RDj,.,, RD;n) +fc.
( t-st a t i s t i c s  are in parentheses).









co" -0.0829 -0.1175 -0.0544 0.0530
(-3.19) (-2.41) (-1.08) (1.12)
cz" -0.1343 -0.1571 -0.0900 0.0533
(-2.98) (-1.74) (-1.00) (0.72)
R 2 0.0172 0.0200 0.0066 0.0034
aFor e a c h  stock, the c orrelation between the pre v i o u s  daytime returns and the 
o v e r n i g h t  returns is calculated in each month, a n d  then av e r a g e d  over the 12 
mont h s  in 1991. The transaction price return due to the b i d - a s k  spread is 
d e f i n e d  as the difference bet w e e n  the return b a s e d  o n  t r a n s a c t i o n  prices and the 
r e t u r n  b a s e d  on bid prices [see GKN (1991)].
P R i n  - the overnight return for stock i b a s e d  on t r a n s a c t i o n  price.
P R t d_, =■ the previous davtime return for stock i b a s e d  on transaction price.
‘ - PRi.a-BRi.n-
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trading volume group, which tends to have the least price
continuation from the daytime into the following night.
2.5. Implied Bid-Ask Spread
Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990) 
observe that the serial covariance of open-to-open 
transaction price returns are more negative than the serial 
covariance of close-to-close transaction price returns. 
Based on Roll's (1984) model, Stoll and Whaley (1990) show 
that the implied spread at the open is larger than at the 
close. They thus conclude that liquidity suppliers charge a 
higher cost of immediacy at the open than at the close. In 
this section we re-examine this issue.
According to Stoll and Whaley's analytical framework,20 
the serial covariance of open-to-open returns to some extent 
depends on the covariance between the overnight and the
20Stoll and Whaley (1990, footnotes 19 and 20) suggest 
that the open-to-open transaction price return on day t, PR0>t, 
can be written as the sum of the overnight return, PR„jt, and 
the daytime return during the previous day, PRdin:
Hence, COV(PR0>t.,, PRot) =COV (PRdt.2, PRdt.,) + COVtPR^, PRd>t.,) + 
COV(PRdt.2, PR,,,) + COV(PRnt.1, PR,,,,) • The only term involving 
returns in the adjacent time period is COV(PRnt.1, PRdi,.t) . 
Similarly, the close-to-close return can be written as
PRc,t "* •
Hence, COV(PRct.,, PRct) =COV (PR*,,.,, PR„it) + COVfPR^.,, PRd,t) + 
COV(PRdt.,, PRn J + COVfPRnj.j, PRdt) . The only term involving 
returns in the adjacent time period is COV(PRdt.!, PR̂ ,) .
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following daytime returns, PR,,, and PRd>t, which tend to be 
negatively correlated. However, our analysis reported in 
Table 2-4 suggests that the negative correlation between PR„t 
and PRdt is not related to the bid-ask spread bounce. 
Therefore, the fact that open-to-open transaction price 
returns are more likely to be reversed than are close-to- 
close transaction price returns does not necessarily indicate 
a larger implied spread at the open.
Furthermore, charging a larger spread at the open may 
not be the optimal behavior for the specialist. If the 
degree of information asymmetry is greater at the open than 
during the rest of the day, the specialist may encourage 
trading by charging a lower spread at the open. More trading 
could release more private information and, hence, reduce 
information asymmetry. This could make subsequent trades 
more profitable. Glosten (1989) shows that, under the 
condition of information asymmetry, this strategic behavior 
of averaging profits over time is optimal. If the 
specialist's behavior is consistent with this hypothesis, we 
should expect a lower implied spread at the open than at the 
close.
We use GKN's (1991) approach to estimate the implied 
spread, which is based on the difference between the 
transaction price return and the bid price return. Following 
their approach, the implied spreads using open-to-open 
returns and close-to-close returns are computed as
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SQ = 2V-cov (RDo t.,, RDot) , and
Sc = 2V-cov(RDCt_!, RDcl) , (3)
where RDol=PRot-BRot and RDct=PRct-BRct.
Stoll and Whaley (1990) use Roll's model to estimate the 
implied spreads, which are
Sc = 2V-cov(PR0t.j, PRot) , and
Sc = 2V-cov(PRCt_!, PRct) . (4)
GKN(1991) show that their approach is less biased since the 
effect of bid price fluctuations on transaction prices is 
removed from their estimator.
It should be pointed out that the implied spread is the 
average gross profits earned by liquidity suppliers in two 
transactions, a buy and a sell. The implied spread is 
therefore the gross profit component of the quoted spread. 
According to Stoll (1989) , the other component of the quoted 
spread is the adverse selection component, which covers 
liquidity suppliers' expected losses to informed traders.
Table 2-6 contains the implied spreads estimated from 
Roll's model and the implied spreads estimated from GKN's 
model. Based on Roll's model, the mean implied spread 
computed from open-to-open returns is 0.506% for the full 
sample, and is 0.012% from close-to-close returns. These 




This table contains the mean and median implied and quoted 
bid-ask spread for 452 NYSE stocks in the sample and all 
stocks within the three average daily dollar volume groups in 
1991. Panel A reports the estimates of implied bid-ask 
spread based on Roll's (1984), and Panel B based on George, 
Kaul, and Nimalendran's (GKN, 1991) model.
Panel A: Roll’s (1984) Model 
Implied bid-ask Bpread(%)* Quoted spread(%)k
(PR*,, PR*,) (PR*.,, PR*.*,) S?0 SPe
All {452 stocks)
Mean spread 0.3266 -0.0222 0.5061 0.0119 0.8986 0.7512Standard error 0.0321 0.0354 0.0517 0.0557 0.0002 0.0002Median spread 0.4371 -0.2104 0.7605 0.1145 0.7789 0.6400Proportion
positive 0.7058 0 .4646 0.7058 0.5044 1.0000 1.0000
Low volume stocks
Mean spread 0.5035 0.25C2 0.67 64 C.3S14 1 .2887 1.0SS0Standard error 0.0613 0.0685 C.0981 0.1052 0.0005 C.0004
Median spread 0.5845 0.4564 0.9276 0. 667 7 1.1020 0.9197
Proport ionpositive 0.7733 0.5800 0.7533 0.5467 1.0000 1.0000
Medium volume stocks
Mean spread 0.2352 -0.0715 0.2598 -0.2790 0.8444 0.7012Standard error 0.0532 0.0555 0.0906 0.0915 0.0003 0.0002Median spread 0.3613 -0.2559 0.5818 -0.5006 0.7727 0.6401Proportion
positive 0.6689 0.4570 0.6026 0.3775 1.0000 1.0000
High volume stocks
Mean spread 0.2421 -0.2435 0.5832 -0.0642 0.5651 0.4668Standard error 0.0488 0.0521 0.0753 0.0844 0.0002 0.0001Median spread 0.3478 -0.4180 0.7841 -0.1562 0.5337 0.4365
Proportion
positive 0.6755 0.3576 0.7616 0.4901 1.0000 1.0000
‘Based on P.oll’s (1984) model, implied bid-ask spread is calculated as 2r-■cov, where cov is
the serial covariances of returns. For each scock, che covariance is comou ted in each month,and then averaged over the 12 months in 1991. The impl:Led bid-ask for each stock is thencalculated based on t.he average monthly serial covariance The mean spreads are obtainea byaveraging across all stocks in the sample and all stocks within each dollar volume group. 
If the average serial covariance is positive, the square root of the absolute value of the 
covariance is calculated and the negative sign is reattached.
*The percentage quoted spread « (ask-bid)/{(ask+bid)/2).
PFLj = the overnight return at day t based on transaction price.
PR̂ , = the daytime return at day t based on transaction price.
?R*».i = the daytime return at day t-1 based on transaction price.
= the open-to-open return at day t-1 based on transaction price.
PR*, = the open-to-open return at day t based on transaction price.
PRo-i = the close-to-close return at day t-1 based on transaction price.
PR*, =  the cloee-to-cloee recurn ac day t based on transaction price.
SP, => the percentage quoted spread at the open.
S?# the percentage quoted spread at the close.
TABLE 2-6 (CONTINUED)
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Panel B: GKN's (1991) Model 
Implied bid-ask spread(%)* Quoted spread(%)k
(RDfcl, RD^) (RD^,, RD..,) (RD„, RD^,) (RDW , RD^,) SP. SP,
All (452 stocks)
Mean spread 0.6348 0.7018 0.6843 0.7425 0.89B6 0.7512
Standaxd error 0.0190 0.0178 0.0207 0.0207 0.0002 0.0002
Median spread 0.S254 0.5990 0.5644 0.6421 0.7789 0.6400Proportion
positive 1 . 0 0 0 0  1 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0.9934 1 . 0 0 0 0 1.0000
Low volume stocks
Mean spread 0.8829 0.9473 0.9593 0.9920 1.2887 1.0880Standard error 0.0368 0.0385 0.0411 0 . 0470 0.0005 0.0004Median spread 0.7676 0.8166 0.7989 0.8319 1.1020 0.9197Proportion
positive 1 . 0 0 0 0  1 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0. 9867 1.0000 1 . 0 0 0 0
Medium volume stocks
Mean spread 0.6201 0.6582 0.6604 0.6997 0.8444 0.7012-Standard error 0.0245 0/0214 0.0264 0.0226 0.0003 0.0002Median spread 0.5450 0.5935 0.5810 0. 6369 0.7727 0.6401Proportion
positive 1 . 0 0 0 0  1 . 0 0 0 0 I.0000 1 . 0 0 0 0 I.0000 I.0000
High volume stocks
Mean spread 0.4031 0.5015 0.4350 0.5374 0.5651 0.4668Standard error 0.0229 0.0157 0.0242 0.0212 0.0002 0.0001Median spread 0.3233 0.4672 0.3554 0.4872 0.5337 0.4365Proportion
positive 1 . 0 0 0 0  1 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0.9934 1..0000 1 . 0 0 0 0
'Based on GKN's (1991) model, implied bid-•ask spread is calculated as 2/-cov, where cov is
the serial covariances of return differences. For each stock, the covariance is comcuted in
each month, and then averaged over the 12 months in 1991. The implied bid-ask for each stock
is then calculated based on the average monthly serial covariance. The mean spreads are
obtained by averaging across all stocks in the sample and all stocks within each dollarvolume group. If the average serial covar.iance is' positive, the square root of the absolute
value of the covariance is calculated and the negative sign is reattached.
‘The percentage quoted spread “ (ask-bid)/((ask+bid)/2).
55V-3R*.-= PR- ,-3R, {.
M„.t =83 PR^-BR^,.= PRwi-BIW
Me. =5
s?„ =* the percentage quoted spread at the open.
SP, rr the percentage quoted spread at the close
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results that the implied spread based on opening prices is 
much larger than the implied spread based on closing prices. 
However, large proportions of implied spreads, especially for 
medium and high trading volume stocks, are negative, which 
are unreasonable and may somewhat reflect biases in Roll's 
model.21
Based on GKN's model, we obtain the opposite results. 
The mean implied spread computed from open-to-open returns is
0.68%, and is 0.74% from close-to-close returns. The null 
hypothesis that these mean implied spreads are the same can 
be rejected at the 1% level of significance, as shown in 
Table 2-7. The result that the mean implied spread based on 
opening prices is less than the mean implied spread based on 
closing prices is especially evident for more actively traded 
stocks. These findings imply that liquidity suppliers charge 
a lower cost of immediacy at the open than at the close. The 
evidence is therefore consistent with Glosten's (1989) 
hypothesis of the specialist averaging profits over time.
Since the implied spread reflects the gross profit 
component, we estimate the adverse selection component of the 
quoted spread as the difference between the quoted spread and 
the implied spread. For the full sample, the mean quoted 
spread at the open is 0.899%, and is 0.751% at the close.
21GKN (1991) show that Roll's (1984) measure can be 
downward biased and may be negative due to the effect of 
positive autocovariance induced by time-varying expected 




This table contains results of the paired-comparison between 
the implied bid-ask spreads based on open-to-open returns, 
S0, and based on close-to-close returns, Sc. The implied 







s0- s c t-statistic
All sample 452 0.6843 0.7425 -0.0582 -4.36
Low volume stocks 150 0.9593 0.9920 -0.0327 -1.19
Medium volume stocks 151 0.6604 0.6997 -0.0393 -2.10
High volume stocks 151 0.4350 0.5374 -0.1024 -4.59
TABLE 2-8
COMPARISONS OF THE ADVERSE SELECTION COMPONENTS
This table contains results of the paired-comparison between 
the adverse selection components of the spreads at the open, 
Y„, and at the close, Yc. Y0 = SP0-S0, and Yc = SPC-SC, where SP0 
and SPC are the average quoted relative spreads at the open 
and at the close. S0 and Sc are the implied spread at the open 





All sample 452 0.2143 0.0087 0.2056 14.83
Low volume stocks 150 0.3294 0.0960 0.2334 7.85
Medium volume stocks 151 0.0408 0.0015 0.0393 9.54
High volume stocks 151 0.0318 -0.0706 0.1024 9.15
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Hence, the mean adverse selection component of the spread at 
the open is about 0.214%, and is about 0.009% at the close. 
As shown in Table 2-8, the mean adverse selection component 
at the open is significantly larger than that at the close. 
These results suggest that liquidity suppliers do expect 
larger losses to informed traders at the open when the degree 
of information asymmetry is likely to be higher.
2.6. Conclusions
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, following 
Amihud and Mendelson (1987, 1991) and Stoll and Whaley
(1990) , we examine whether the greater volatility and more 
negative serial correlation at the open than at the close is 
attributable to the larger bid-ask spread at the open. 
Although transaction prices moving between the bid and the 
ask could increase the price volatility, the greater 
volatility at the open could not be attributed to the bid-ask 
spread bounce. Instead, we find that the greater transaction 
price volatility at the open is related to greater bid price 
volatility at the open. Furthermore, the transaction price 
reversals around the open are also related to bid price 
reversals around the open. Since information asymmetry is 
likely to be higher at the open, the greater bid price 
volatility and bid price reversals around the open may 
reflect larger pricing errors quoted by liquidity suppliers. 
Therefore, unlike Stoll and Whaley's suggestion that
43
liquidity suppliers benefit from price reversals around the 
open, the reversals may reflect liquidity suppliers' losses 
to informed traders.
Second, we examine the strategic behavior of the 
specialist at the opening call. Stoll and Whaley (1990) 
suggest that the specialist exploits his monopoly position at 
the opening call and charges a higher cost of immediacy. 
However, according to Glosten's model, when information 
asymmetry is high, the specialist who charges a higher cost 
of trading, may not be profit-maximizing. Hence, we argue 
that, the specialist may set a lower cost of immediacy to 
encourage trading and to release more information at the 
opening call. This could reduce information asymmetry and 
make subsequent trades more profitable.
We use George, Kaul, and Nimalendran1s (1991) model, 
which is less biased than Roll's (1984) model, to estimate 
the implied spreads at the open and at the close. Consistent 
with our argument, the results show that, on average, the 
implied spread earned by liquidity suppliers is less at the 
open than at the close. This finding, therefore, refutes 
Stoll and Whaley's contention that the specialist exploits 
the monopoly position and earns a higher profit at the 
opening call.
CHAPTER 3
INTRADAY PATTERNS IN GROSS PROFITS 
EARNED BY NYSE SPECIALISTS
3.1. Introduction
The specialist who makes a market for a security on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) tends to buy low (at bid 
price) and sell high (at ask price). The difference between 
the selling price and the purchasing price reflects the gross 
profit per share earned by the specialist.22 Stoll (1989) 
suggests that the specialist will not earn the whole quoted 
bid-ask spread when there is information asymmetry between 
the specialist and informed traders. In this paper we 
consider the strategic behavior of the specialist in 
resolving information asymmetry and its implication for 
intraday patterns in gross profits.
Glosten (1989) hypothesizes that when information 
asymmetry is high, a monopolist specialist may reduce profits 
or even realize losses to induce informed traders to trade 
and to release their information. This reduces the adverse 
selection problem and makes subsequent trades more 
profitable. The specialist can earn greater profits to
22The profit is gross in the sense that it should cover 
order processing costs, inventory holding costs, and other 
operating expenses incurred in market making.
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offset the losses realized early on in the trading.23 This 
hypothesis of averaging profits over time implies that the 
pattern in gross profits earned by the specialist is 
inversely related to the pattern in information asymmetry. 
The first objective of this paper is to examine empirically 
whether the intraday pattern in gross profits earned by the 
specialist is consistent with this hypothesis.
Private information is likely to be accumulated over the 
nontrading period and released via trading. Hence, Brock and 
Kleidon (1990) note that information asymmetry is highest at 
the beginning of the trading day because of a long period of 
nontrading since the closing on the previous day. Indeed, 
Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Hasbrouck (1991a) show that 
trades are more informative and move quote prices more at the 
beginning than during the rest of the trading day. If the 
specialist loses on some trades at the beginning of trading 
and learns some information of informed traders, the gross 
profits could be increased in subsequent trades as 
information asymmetry is reduced. Therefore, the hypothesis 
of averaging profits through time predicts that the 
specialist's gross profits are lower at the beginning than 
during the rest of the trading day.
23Glosten (1989, p.213) notes that "It is reasonable to 
assume that there are times in which the specialist enjoys a 
monopolist position and times in which this monopolist power 
is curtailed by other traders. Thus, the ability of the 
specialist to average profits over time may be restricted."
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Roll (1984) points out that successive transaction price 
changes tend to be inversely correlated because of 
transaction prices bouncing between bid and ask prices. This 
bouncing between the bid-ask spread creates a temporary price 
effect, which allows the specialist to generate gross profits 
to cover costs in market making. Thus, a portion of price 
volatility is attributable to the bid-ask spread. Price 
volatility can also be generated from private information 
released via trading, as theoretically demonstrated by Kyle 
(1985) and empirically shown by French and Roll (1986), among 
others. The strategic behavior of the specialist to reduce 
information asymmetry suggests that the impacts on price 
volatility of the bid-ask spread and of private information 
may vary through time. The second objective of this paper is 
to empirically distinguish the impacts of these two factors 
on intraday volatility.
Since the hypothesis of averaging profits over time 
predicts lower gross profits at the beginning, price 
volatility due to prices bouncing between the bid-ask spread 
should be lower at the beginning than during the rest of the 
trading day. Conversely, since information asymmetry is 
expected to be higher at the beginning, price volatility due 
to private information should be larger at the beginning than 
during the rest of the trading day.
Our study is related to a number of previous studies, 
which examine the U-shaped intraday patterns in trading
volume and price volatility.24 In particular, Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) suggest that the concentration of liquidity 
trading induces information trading. Since trading volume 
tends to concentrate at the beginning and at the end of the 
trading day, their model implies that trades are more 
informative at the beginning and at the end of the trading 
day than during the rest of the day. Also, the higher 
volatility at the beginning and at the end of the trading day 
are both attributable to private information revealed by 
informed traders. Our predictions differ from theirs. While 
they assume a passive role for the market maker,25 we 
emphasize the strategic behavior of the market maker in 
reducing information asymmetry through time, and suggest 
possible different sources of intraday volatility.
Wei (1992) considers an inverted U-shaped pattern for 
the transitory cost component of the bid-ask spread. He 
conjectures that the lower transitory cost component may 
induce some informed trading, leading to higher price 
volatility at the beginning and at the end of the trading 
day. Although the gross profits earned by the specialist are 
related to the transitory cost component of the bid-ask
24See, for example, Wood, Mclnish, and Ord (1985) and 
Harris (1986).
25Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) assume the market maker 
sets prices so that his expected profits are zero in every 
trade. The hypothesis of averaging profits over time is 
based on Glosten's (1989) model in that the market maker sets 
prices to maximize expected profits.
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spread, our prediction for the intraday pattern in gross 
profits is not an inverted U-shaped pattern. Instead, the 
gross profit is predicted to be lower at the beginning than 
during the rest of the day.
Mclnish and Wood (1992) show that the bid-ask spread is 
largest at the beginning of the trading day. A large bid-ask 
spread tends to induce high price volatility. However, the 
hypothesis of averaging profits over time suggests that the 
higher volatility at the beginning of trading is not due to 
the larger bid-ask spread. The hypothesis also suggests that 
the specialist does not earn higher gross profits, even 
though the quoted spread is larger, at the beginning compared 
to the rest of the trading day. This is because, if 
information asymmetry is highest at the beginning of the 
trading day, then adjusting the quotes to reflect private 
information from trades increases price volatility, but 
reduces the realized spread earned by the specialist.
Another factor that may affect gross profits earned by 
the specialist is the pattern in order arrivals. Hasbrouck 
and Ho (1987), Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988), and 
Hasbrouck (1991b) document that buy orders tend to follow buy 
orders, and sell orders tend to follow sell orders. Since a 
buy order following a sell order allows the specialist to 
earn the bid-ask spread, order persistence reduces the 
specialist's chance of earning the bid-ask spread. 
Furthermore, the specialist's gross profit is generated from
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the effective bid-ask spread. However, because a large 
portion of trades take place inside the quoted bid-ask 
spread, the average effective spread is smaller than the 
average quoted spread. Therefore, to properly estimate the 
intraday pattern in gross profits earned by the specialist, 
we also need to take order persistence and inside-the-quote 
transactions into consideration.
In the next section we present an empirical model to 
estimate the specialist's gross profits. The model is very 
similar to that used by Huang and Stoll (1992). Section 3.3 
discusses intraday transaction data. Section 3.4 reports 
estimation results of gross profits. Section 3.5 compares 
the sources of intraday volatility. The final section 
contains our conclusions.
3.2. The Empirical Model
Let Xt denote the specialist's estimated value of the 
security at time t, conditional on the information available 
to the specialist at time t-1. Since the conditional 
expectation is unobservable, a convenient assumption is that 
the quote midpoint reflects this conditional value of the 
security.
One objection to this assumption, as argued by the 
inventory control theory, is that the quotes may be 
temporarily perturbed away from the specialist's estimated 
value of the security. However, Hasbrouck (1988, p.251) uses
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a sophisticated VAR model and finds that "effects of dealer 
inventory-control behavior on quotes, as ascertained from the 
transient impact of trades on quote revisions, are 
insignificant." Madhavan and Smidt (1991, p.120) use the 
actual specialist inventory data and show that "specialist 
inventory control has a weak effect on intradaily prices." 
George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991, p.649) further show "no 
evidence for the existence of an inventory cost component." 
Hence, we assume that the prevailing quote midpoint at time 
t, denoted as Qt, is the specialist's estimated value of the 
security, prior to the trade at time t.26
Denote Pt as the trade price at time t. Following Huang 
and Stoll (1992) , the trade price is related to the quote 
midpoint as
Pt — Qt + zt. (5)
Huang and Stoll (1992) suggest that z, can be regarded as half 
of the (signed) effective bid/ask spread. The effective 
spread is equal to the quoted spread for trades that are 
executed at the quoted ask or bid price. However, the 
effective spread is less than the quoted spread for trades 
that are executed inside the quoted spread.
26In reality, since the specialist maintains the book of 
limit orders, the price quotations may be those of either the 
specialist or public limit orders.
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Hasbrouck and Ho (1987) and Hasbrouck (1991a) classify 
a trade as a buy (sell) order if the trade price is greater 
(less) than the prevailing quote midpoint. Hence, the trade 
at time t can be classified as a buy order if zt > 0 , and a 
sell order if zt < 0 .
The adverse information theory suggests that the 
specialist will adjust the quote midpoint upward following a 
buy order, and downward following a sale order [see Stoll 
(1989)]. Similar to Huang and Stoll (1992), the quote 
revision process due to trades is written as27
AQt+1 = Xzt + el+1, (6)
27In this study, we assume no inventory holding cost. 
However, this assumption can be easily relaxed as follows. 
Let a be the inventory holding cost component of the spread. 
Given the conditional value Xt, the dealer sets the quote 
midpoint as
Q, = X, + az,.!
That is, the dealer sets the quote midpoint higher (lower) 
following a public buy (sale) in order to induce public sale 
(buy) orders to even out his inventory position. As in 
eq.(6), the change in the conditional value is
AXt+1 = Xz, + e,+1
The change in the quote midpoint can then be expressed as
AQ,+1 AX(+j + azt ocz t.j
= (X+a)zt - Qiz,., + et+1
Empirically, we find that a is very close to zero, consistent 
with previous studies that show weak inventory-control effect 
on dealer pricing.
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where AQt+1=Qt+1-Qt; X is the proportion of the effective spread 
due to adverse selection; and the error term et+1 reflects 
arrivals of public information and market frictions such as 
price discreteness and the lag in price adjustment due to 
limit orders. These market frictions may cause serial 
dependence in the error term. However, we find that, for 
most of our sample firms, the autocorrelations in the error 
term are small and that adjusting for these autocorrelations 
does not have a material effect on the estimate of X.
Empirically, Lin (1992) shows that the quote revision 
process in eq. (6) tends to perform better than the quote 
revision process with the trade indicator variable and signed 
trading volume proposed by Hasbrouck (1991b). There are two 
possible reasons that the effective spread can efficiently 
capture the impact of trading volume on the quote midpoint. 
First, trades with large volume tend to have large effective 
spreads (see Choe, Mclnish, and Wood (1991)]. Second, while 
the relation between quote revision and trading volume may be 
complex and nonlinear, the relation between quote revision 
and effective spread appears to be linear.
The intuition underlying eq. (6) is that Xzt is the 
amount of quote revision attributable to private information 
revealed from the trade at time t. If the trade carries no 
private information, i.e., X=0, as in Roll's (1984) model, 
then the quote midpoint follows a random walk. Conversely, 
if the whole effective spread is due to adverse selection,
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i.e., X=l, as in Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model, then the 
quote midpoint is immediately adjusted to the trade price. 
These are the two extreme cases. Normally, we expect 0<X<1 
because the specialist has to earn a portion of the effective 
spread to cover market making costs.
The portion of the effective spread earned by the 
specialist is inferred as follows. Given the updated quote 
midpoint, Qt+1, the trade price at time t+1, Pt+1, can also be 
expressed as Pt+i=Qt+i+zt+i • The transaction-to-transaction 
price change from time t to t+1 can thus be decomposed as:
APt+1 — AQt+1 + zt+1 — zt, (7)
where APt+1=Pt+1-Pt. In this expression, the first part of the 
transaction price change is due to the adjustment in quote 
midpoint, which reflects a change in the specialist's 
conditional value of the security from time t to t+1. The 
second and third parts are due to the effective bid/ask 
spreads.
As discussed previously, a buy (sell) order is 
associated with a positive (negative) z,. That buy orders 
tend to follow buy orders, and sell orders tend to follow 
sell orders implies that z, will be serially correlated. 
Following Hasbrouck and Ho's (1987, p.1042) suggestion, the 
pattern of order arrivals is modelled as an AR(1) process:
zl+,= 0zt + ijl+1 (8)
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where |0|<1, and ijl+l is the error term. The error term is 
assumed to be serially uncorrelated, and uncorrelated with 
el+1 in eq. (6) . As shown by Hasbrouck and Ho (1987) , under 
the assumption of a constant effective spread, i.e., |zt|=k 
for all t, eq. (8) implies that, if the transaction at time 
t is a buy (sell) order, there is a probability of (1+0)/2
that the next transaction will be a buy (sell) order. The
conditional probability of order reversal is then equal to 
(1-0)/2. The probability structure will be more complex if 
the effective spread changes over time. However, in our 
model, the parameter, 0, is a sufficient statistic for the 
pattern of order arrivals.
With the relations in eqs. (6) and (8), eq. (7) can be 
simplified to
AP,+1 = - |Szt + ut+w (9)
where APt+1=Pt+1-Pt; /3=1-X-0; and u^^e^+ij^.! is the error term. 
Eq. (9) is a predictive model. Since a portion of the 
effective spread is needed to compensate the market maker, 
the model predicts a temporary price effect. That is, if 
traders sell shares of the security to the specialist at time 
t at Pt with zt<0, then the price at time t+1 is expected to 
increase by
E(APl+,|z,<0) = j8 | zt| . (10)
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The expected increase in price after a specialist buy is the 
expected amount earned by the specialist for providing 
liquidity services. Hence, /3 may be interpreted as the gross 
profit component of the effective spread.
If the trade at time t is a specialist sale with zt>0, 
the expected decrease in price at time t+1 will be
E(APt+I|zt>0) = - jS|zt| , (11)
and the gross profit per share the specialist is expected to 
earn from the trade is j3|zt|. Since /3=l-\-0, the derivation 
suggests that the specialist's gross profit per share is 
affected by three factors: adverse selection (X) , order
persistence (0) , and the effective spread (zt) .
The hypothesis of averaging profits through time 
suggests that the gross profit component of the effective 
spread in eq. (9) and the adverse selection component of the 
effective spread in eq. (6) may vary through time. To 
examine their intraday patterns, we divide each trading day 
into 13 thirty-minute intervals. The first interval is from 
9:30 A.M. to 10:00 A.M. and the last interval from 3:30 P.M. 
to 4:00 P.M.. The division of the trading day into 13 
intervals is similar to that used by Mclnish and Wood (1992) . 
Estimation results in these 13 intraday intervals allows us 
to observe how quickly the high level of information 
asymmetry at the beginning is reduced to the level of 
information asymmetry at the closing of the trading day.
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Since the explanatory variable is the same for eqs. (6) 
and (9) , there is no efficiency gain from seemingly unrelated 
regressions. Furthermore, because the variances of the error 
terms in eqs. (6) and (9) are likely to vary through time, 
the approach with dummy variables may not be appropriate. We 
thus separately estimate eqs. (6) and (9) for each sample 
firm in each of the 13 intervals. The sample firms are 
discussed in the next section. In the empirical tests 
reported in Section 4, we use the logarithms of the trade 
price and of the quote midpoint. The log transformation 
produces continuously compounded returns and reduces the 
problem of price discreteness.
Based on eq. (6) , the variance of trade-to-trade returns 
based on quote midpoints, crQ2, in each intraday interval can 
be decomposed into
where A2ctz2 can be regarded as the price volatility due to 
private information revealed from trades and cre2 as the price 
volatility due to the error term.
Similarly, based on eq. (9), the variance of trade-to- 
trade returns based on trade prices, ctp2, in each intraday 
interval can be decomposed into
ctq2 = \2ctz2 + a,. 2 c t (12)
oP2 =  j8 2ctz2 +  cr,. 2 U 9 (13)
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where /32az2 can be regarded as the price volatility due to 
trade price bouncing between the bid-ask spread. Thus, the 
estimates of X in eq. (6) and j8 in eq. (9) along with the 
variance of the effective spread in each of the 13 intraday 
intervals allow us to compare the sources of intraday 
volatility.
3.3. Data
To test the hypothesis of the specialist averaging 
profits over time, we select a sample of 100 common stocks 
from the 1988 Institute for the Study of Security Markets 
(ISSM) files. These 100 common stocks are the first 100 NYSE 
common stocks on the files that have an average price above 
$10.0, more than 2,000 trades, and no stock splits in 1988.28 
The average stock prices in 1988 for the sample firms range 
from $10.09 to $91.19 with the mean equal to $28.74 and the 
median equal to $24.16. The number of trades in 1988 ranges 
from 2,001 to 63,365 with the mean 12,893 and the median 
7,667.
28The requirement of an average price above $10.0 is to 
reduce the impact of discreteness. The requirement of more 
than 2,000 transactions in the sample period is to assure 
sufficient observations to carry out reliable estimations of 
the components of the spread in each intraday interval. We 
discard firms with stock splits because several studies show 
empirically that stock splits tend to change firms' variances 
of stock returns and bid/ask spreads [see, for example, 
Ohlson and Penman (1985), Dravid (1987), and Conroy, Harris, 
and Benet (1990)].
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All trades in 1988, except for opening transactions on 
each day, are included for analysis.29 For each trade, the 
transaction time, the trade price, and the prevailing bid and 
ask prices are identified. Lee and Ready (1991) find that 
prevailing quotes may sometimes be recorded ahead of trades. 
Following their suggestion, we identify the prevailing quotes 
for each transaction as the quotes that are in effect five 
seconds earlier and are BBO-eligible (i.e., eligible for 
inclusion in the National and NASD Best Bid and Offer 
calculation). The prevailing quote midpoint is then computed 
as the average of the prevailing bid and ask prices.30
Table 3-1 reports intraday patterns in quoted and 
effective bid-ask spreads. Consistent with previous studies, 
the quoted spread for our sample firms exhibits a U-shaped 
pattern. The average quoted percentage spread declines from 
1.13% in the 9:30-10:00 interval to 1.00% in the
290pening transactions are excluded from the sample 
because they are conducted in the call market, while 
transactions after the opening are generally conducted in the 
continuous market.
30Occasionally, trades with exactly the same time, price, 
and trading volume are observed on the ISSM files. If there 
are several trades reported at exactly the same time, price, 
and volume, we take the first trade and discard the remaining 
trades. We also discard trades and quotes that are initiated 
on regional exchanges. Hasbrouck and Ho (1987) point out 
that a single trade may be reported as multiple trades if 
different parts of a market order clear at different prices. 
They thus take into the sample for analysis only those trades 
that are separated by at least two minutes. We apply the 
two-minute requirement to our sample and find that the 
requirement does not alter the results much.
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TABLE 3-1
INTRADAY PATTERNS IN BID-ASK SPREADS 
Average quoted and effective bid-ask spreads for the 100 NYSE















9:30-10: 00 1.13 0.77 0.256 0.174
10:00-10 : 30 1.06"" 0.71"" 0.236"" 0.156""
10:30-11 : 00 1.04"" 0.70" 0.232"" 0.154
11:00-11 : 30 1.03"" 0 .68"" 0.228"" 0.149
11:30-12 : 00 1 .02" 0.68 0.226" 0.150
1 2:00-12 : 30 1. 01 0.67 0.225 0.149
12:30-1: 00 1.00 0 . 68 0.223" 0.151
1 :00-1 :30 1.02 0.68 0.225 0.149
1:30-2: 00 1.00"" 0.67" 0 .222" 0.147
2 :00-2 :30 1.00 0 . 68 + 0.223 0.149+
2:30-3: 00 1 . 00 0 . 68 0.223 0.150
3:00-3: 30 1.02 + + 0. 69 + 0.226 + + 0.152+
3:30-4: 00 1.04++ 0.71++ 0.230++ 0.158++
"Denote A,, Bt, and pt as the ask, bid and trade prices at time 
t. The quoted dollar spread is Aj-Bj the quoted percentage 
spread is (At-Bt)/qu where qt= (At+B,)/2 ; the effective dollar 
spread is 2 |p,-qt|; and the effective percentage spread is 
2 | log(pt) -log (qt) | .
The signs —  and - (++ and +) indicate that the average
spread in the interval is significant smaller (larger) than 
the average spread in the preceding interval at the 1% level 
and 5% level of significance, respectively.
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2:30-3:00 interval, and then increases to 1.04% in the last 
half hour of trading.
The effective percentage spread is computed as 2 | Pt-Qt | , 
where Pt is the logarithm of the trade price at time t and Qt 
is the logarithm of the quote midpoint between the bid and 
ask prices at time t .31 Similar to the quoted spread, the 
effective spread also exhibits a U-shaped intraday pattern. 
However, the average effective spread is smaller than the 
average quoted spread in each intraday interval. On average, 
the effective spread is only about 68% of the quoted spread. 
The effective spread is the basis of our estimates of gross 
profits earned by the specialist.
Table 3-2 reports intraday patterns in the average half- 
hour trading volume and variance of half-hour returns. Both 
trading volume and return variance show the usual U-shaped 
pattern. These results suggest that our sample firms have 
characteristics similar to those in previous studies. 
However, the intraday patterns in information asymmetry and 
gross profits earned by the market maker are not U-shaped, as 
will be shown next.
31This measure of the effective percentage spread is 
approximately equal to 2 1 (pt-qt)/qt| , where pt is the trade 
price and qt is the quote midpoint in dollar terms.
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TABLE 3-2
INTRADAY PATTERNS IN TRADING VOLUME AND VOLATILITY
Average half-hour trading volumes, variances of half-hour 
trade price returns, and variances of half-hour quote 















9:30-10:00 151.73 7.34 11.26
10:00-10:30 145.66 6.01" 5.63"
10:30-11:00 129.18“ 5.56“ 4.38"
11:00-11:30 115.23" 4.85" 3.46"
11:30-12:00 103.74" 4.91 3.37
12:00-12:30 92.12“ 4.78 3.03
12:30-1:00 79.03" 4.52 3.05
1:00-1:30 76.59 4.45 3.00
1:30-2:00 72.56 3.81" 2.44““
2:00-2:30 83 .22 + + 4.21++ 2.48
2:30-3:00 88.64++ 4.44 2.72
3:00-3:30 9 9.49++ 4.91++ 3.13++
3:30-4:00 144.30++ 6.38++ 4.21++
The signs —  and - (++ and +) indicate that the variable in 
the interval is significant smaller (larger) than the same 
variable in the preceding interval at the 1% level and 5% 
level of significance, respectively.
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3.4. Evidence of an Intraday Pattern in Gross Profits
Trades in the period of high information asymmetry will 
have large impacts on quote prices. Because of a long 
nontrading period preceding the opening, we expect that, on 
average, the level of information asymmetry is higher in the 
first trading period than during the rest of the trading day. 
Based on eq. (6), we first examine the intraday pattern in 
information asymmetry. Eq. (6) is estimated for each of the 
100 sample firms in each of the 13 intraday intervals. We 
report in Table 3-3 the mean results of the 100 estimates in 
each interval.32
According to Table 3-3, trades in the first half-hour 
interval show the highest information asymmetry in the sense 
that they move the quote prices the most. On average, the 
quote price revision in response to trades in the first half- 
hour interval is about 61% of the effective spread, as 
indicated by the estimates of X. This suggests that, on 
average, the adverse selection component accounts for 61% of 
the effective spread in the first half hour of trading. The 
adverse selection component declines to 46% of the effective 
spread in the second half-hour interval. In the third half- 
hour interval, the adverse selection component decreases to 
39% of the effective spread, and remains stable around that 
level for the rest of the trading day. In the last half-hour
32The median estimates are very similar to the mean 
estimates reported in Table 3-3. The results based on the 
median estimates are available upon request.
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Table 3-3
ESTIMATES OF AVERAGE QUOTE REVISIONS DUE TO TRADES
The quote revision model is estimated for each of the 100 
sample firm in each of the 13 intraday intervals. The model 
is
AQt+, = a + Xzt + el+1, (6)
where AQt+1=Qt+1-Qt; a=Q; zt=Pt-Qt, Pt is the log trade price at 
time t and Qt is the log midpoint between the bid and ask 
prices at time t; X is the proportion of the effective spread 
due to adverse selection; and et+1 is the error term.
Variance Decomposition 









9:30-10:00 0.61 34.22 0.55 3.02 1.80 1.22
10:00-10:30 0.46"" 22.71 0.38 1.71“" 0.76“" 0.95""
10:30-11:00 0.39"" 18.79 0.31 1.33"“ 0.51"" 0.82""
11:00-11:30 0.38 17.93 0.30 1.18““ 0.41"" 0.77"
11:30-12:00 0.37 17.28 0.30 1. 09" 0.39 0.70"
12:00-12:30 0. 37 16. 00 0.29 1.11 0.37 0.74
12:30-1:00 0.37 15.16 0.29 1.15 0.42 0.73
1:00-1:30 0.38 15.20 0.30 1.15 0.43 0.73
1:30-2:00 0.36 14.74 0.29 1 .00"" 0.33"" 0.67"
2:00-2:30 0.36 16.04 0.29 0.98 0.33 0.65
2:30-3:00 0.36 17. 09 0.29 1.00 0.33 0.67
3:00-3:30 0.35 18.25 0.29 1.00 0.32 0.68
3:30-4:00 0.35 21.09 0.28 1 . 00 0.31 0 . 68
The signs —  and - (++ and +) indicate that the variable in 
the interval is significant smaller (larger) than the same 
variable in the preceding interval at the 1% level and 5% 
level of significance, respectively.
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interval, the adverse selection component is about 35% of the 
effective spread.
The estimates of X are all very significant; the average 
t-statistics on X in the 13 intraday intervals range from 
14.74 to 34.22. The average R2's for the model range from 
0.28 to 0.55, suggesting that the effective spread, zt, 
explains a substantial portion of variation in quote 
revisions in each intraday interval.
Figure 3-1 exhibits the dynamics of the adverse 
selection component of the effective spread. The results are 
consistent with Foster and Viswanathan's (1993) and 
Hasbrouck's (1990a) findings that information asymmetry is 
higher at the beginning than during the rest of the trading 
day. Our results further indicate that the high level of 
information asymmetry at the opening is reduced to the level 
of information asymmetry at the closing in about one hour of 
trading.
The hypothesis of the specialist averaging profits 
through time predicts that the intraday pattern in gross 
profits should be inversely related to the pattern in 
information asymmetry. To examine this prediction, we 
estimate the gross profit component of the effective spread 
using eq. (9). Similarly, eq. (9) is estimated for each of 
the 100 sample firms in each of the 13 intraday intervals. 




The INTRADAY PATTERN IN THE ADVERSE SELECTION 
COMPONENT OF THE EFFECTIVE SPREAD
The trading day is divided into 13 thirty-minute intervals 
with the first interval 9 : 3 0 - 1 0 : 0 0  A.M. and the last interval 
3 : 3 0 - 4 : 0 0  P.M.. The adverse selection component X is
estimated for each of the 1 0 0  NYSE sample firms in each of 
the 13 intervals with the model
AQ,+i =  a  + Xzt + e t+j (6 )
The mean of the 1 0 0  estimates of X in each interval is 
depicted in the figure and reported in Table 3 - 3 .
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TABLE 3-4
ESTIMATES OF AVERAGE TRADE PRICE CHANGES DUE TO SPREADS
The trade price change model is estimated for each of the 100 
sample firm in each of the 13 intraday intervals. The model 
is
APt+1 = b - |3zt + ut+i, (9)
where APt+1=Pt+1-Pt; b=0; zt=P,-Qt, Pt is the log trade price at 
time t and Qt is the log midpoint between the bid and ask 
prices at time t; /3 is the gross profit component of the 













9:30-10:00 0.16 6.24 0.05 2.66 0.18 2.49
10:00-10:30 0.28++ 9.70 0.09 2. 61 0.24++ 2.38“
10:30-11:00 0.32++ 10.23 0.11 2.60 0.33 2.28
11:00-11:30 0. 34 + 10.86 0.12 2.44 0.30 2.15
11:30-12:00 0.34 10.44 0.12 2.46 0.31 2.16
12:00-12:30 0. 34 9.74 0.12 2.45 0.31 2.14
12:30-1:00 0.34 9.00 0.12 2.47 0. 32 2.16
1:00-1:30 0.33 8.53 0.12 2.51 0. 32 2.20
1:30-2:00 0.35 9.30 0.12 2.31“ 0.32 2.00“
2:00-2:30 0. 34 9.64 0.12 2.40 0.33 2.07
2:30-3:00 0.34 9.96 0.12 2.51 0.35 2.17
3:00-3:30 0.35 10.67 0. 12 2.49 0. 38 2.12
3:30-4:00 0.33 11.85 0.11 2.63 0.31 2.33++
The signs —  and - (++ and +) indicate that the variable in 
the interval is significant smaller (larger) than the same 
variable in the preceding interval at the 1% level and 5% 
level of significance, respectively.
Consistent with our prediction, the gross profit 
component of the effective spread is lowest at the first 
half-hour interval. On average, it accounts for only 16% of 
the effective spread. The gross profit component increases 
to 28% of the effective spread in the second half-hour 
interval. In the third half-hour interval, the gross profit 
component increases to 32% of the effective spread, and stays 
stable around that level for the rest of the day. In the 
last half-hour interval, the gross profit component is about 
33% of the effective spread, on average.
Figure 3-2 exhibits the gross profit components of the 
effective spread in the 13 intraday intervals. Comparing 
Figures 3-1 and 3-2, the intraday pattern in gross profits is 
clearly inversely related to the intraday pattern in 
information asymmetry. These results support Glosten's 
(1989) hypothesis of averaging profits over time. Since 
information asymmetry is highest at the beginning of trading, 
the specialist appears to stimulate trading by reducing his 
gross profits at the beginning of trading. In this way the 
specialist learns some information of the informed and 
reduces the adverse selection problem. This makes subsequent 
trades more profitable. Figures 3-2 also indicates that it 
takes about one hour of trading for the specialist to 
increase the level of profitability to the level at the 
closing of the trading day.
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FIGURE 3-2
The INTRADAY PATTERN IN THE GROSS PROFIT 
COMPONENT OF THE EFFECTIVE SPREAD
The trading day is divided into 13 thirty-minute intervals 
with the first interval 9:30-10:00 A.M. and the last interval 
3:30-4:00 P.M.. The gross profit component /3 is estimated 
for each of the 100 NYSE sample firms in each of the 13 
intervals with the model
APt+1 = b - jSz, + ut+I. (9)
The mean of the 100 estimates of j8 in each interval is 
depicted in the figure and reported in Table 3-4.
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Table 3-5 and Figure 3-3 report the average gross profit 
per share in cents for each of the 13 intraday intervals. 
The number for each firm in each interval is computed as /3 x 
mean(|zt|) x mean(qt), i.e., the gross profit component times 
half of the average effective relative spread times the 
average quote midpoint (in dollar terms) in the interval. 
The results indicate that the specialist earns about 1.23 
cents per share from each trade in the first half-hour 
interval, and 2.03 cents per share in the second half-hour 
interval, and around 2.45 cents per share during the rest of 
the trading day.33
Certainly, because of limit order traders, floor 
traders, and upstairs traders, the specialist does not 
participate in all trades. From NYSE and SEC data, Smidt 
(1988) estimates the gross profits earned by NYSE specialists 
based on specialist transactions for the 11 year period from 
1970 through 1980. He reports that "on each transaction the 
average gain of the specialist is about 2.25 cents" (p.13). 
In measuring transaction costs on the NYSE, Berkowitz, Logue, 
and Noser (1988, p.104) show that, on average, the market 
impact costs for trades in 1985 are "slightly less than two
33As shown in Table 3-5, the average trade sizes are 
2,337 shares and 2,335 shares in the first and second half- 
hour intervals. These trade sizes imply that the specialist 
earns about $28.74 and $47.40 per trade in the first and 
second half-hour intervals, respectively. The average trade 
size in the rest of the trading day is about 1,992 shares, 
implying $48.80 per trade earned by the specialist.
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TABLE 3-5
THE AVERAGE GROSS PROFIT PER SHARE IN CENTS
The average gross profit per share from each trade earned by 
the specialist in each interval is computed as the average of 
x mean(|zt|) x mean(qt) across the 100 sample firms, where 
13 is the gross profit component of the effective spread and 
is obtained from Table 4; zt=P,-Qt, Pt is the log trade price 
and Qt is the log midpoint between the bid and ask prices at 















9:30-10:00 1.23 2,337 1,198
10:00-10:30 2.03++ 2,335 1,189
10:30-11:00 2.34++ 2,396 1,067""
11:00-11:30 2.44 2,180" 1,019""
11:30-12:00 2.41 2,072 968""
12:00-12:30 2.44 2,107 861""
12:30-1:00 2.43 1,939" 744""
1:00-1:30 2.36 1,934 716""
1:30-2:00 2.49 1,833 737 + +
2:00-2:30 2.48 1,848 865++
2:30-3:00 2.51 1,843 950+ +
3:00-3:30 2.55 1,834 1,093++
3:30-4:00 2.55 1,922 1,481++
The signs —  and - (++ and +) indicate that the variable in 
the interval is significant smaller (larger) than the same 
variable in the preceding interval at the 1% level and 5% 
level of significance, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10 11 12 13
Time C30-mtnute intervoQ
FIGURE 3-3
THE INTRADAY PATTERN IN THE AVERAGE GROSS PROFIT PER SHARE 
IN CENTS EARNED BY THE SPECIALIST
The trading day is divided into 13 thirty-minute intervals 
with the first interval 9:30-10:00 A.M. and the last interval 
3:30-4:00 P.M.. The average gross profit per share from each 
trade earned by the specialist in each interval is computed 
as the average of /3 x  mean(|zt|) x  mean(qt), where j3 is the 
gross profit component of the effective spread and is 
obtained from Table 3-4; zt=Pt-Qt/ P( is the log trade price at 
time t and Qt is the log midpoint between the bid and ask 
prices at time t; qt is the quote midpoint in dollar terms.
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cents per share." The market impact costs paid by traders 
should correspond to the gross profits earned by market 
makers who provide liquidity services to traders. The 
results in these two studies suggest that our estimates of 
the gross profit per share, ranging from 1.23 to 2.55 cents, 
in the intraday intervals are not unreasonable. In fact, our 
estimates are very close to the estimates in these two 
studies. Furthermore, our estimates of the gross profit per 
share indicate an intraday pattern, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis of specialist averaging profits over time.
3.5. Sources of Intraday Volatility
The literature on the market microstructure has 
speculated on possible causes of the U-shaped pattern in 
price volatility. Several studies have described private 
information as the main cause of this empirical regularity. 
In this section we examine the intraday patterns in price 
volatility due to private information from trades and price 
volatility due to trade price bouncing between the bid-ask 
spread.
In Table 3-3, we decompose the trade-to-trade return 
variance calculated from quote midpoints, ctq2, into volatility 
due to private information from trades, X2az2, and volatility 
due to the error term, ctc2. The average return volatility due 
to private information revealed from trades is highest in the 
first half-hour interval. It accounts for about 55% of the
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quote return variance in the first half-hour interval, and 
38% of the quote return variance in the second half-hour 
interval, on average. The volatility due to private 
information from trades then decreases toward the end of the 
trading day. In the last half-hour interval, the volatility 
due to private information from trades accounts for only 28% 
of the quote return variance.
The results are depicted in Figure 3-4. This clearly 
illustrates that the volatility due to private information 
from trades in the first two intervals are larger than the 
volatility in the rest of the trading day. This intraday 
pattern suggests that information revealed from trades 
declines very fast in the first hour of trading. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the specialist reduces 
information asymmetry in early hours of trading and makes 
subsequent trades more profitable. The evidence implies that 
private information revealed from trades is not the cause of 
the high volatility at the end of the trading day.
In Table 3-4, we decompose the trade-to-trade return 
variance calculated from trade prices, crP2, into volatility 
due to price bouncing between the bid-ask spread, j82az2, and 
volatility due to the error term, au2. The price volatility 
due to prices bouncing between the bid-ask spread is lower in 
the first half-hour interval than during the rest of the day. 
The pattern is illustrated in Figure 3-5. Since prices 





THE INTRADAY PATTERN IN PRICE VOLATILITY DUE TO PRIVATE 
INFORMATION REVEALED FROM TRADE
The trading day is divided into 13 thirty-minute intervals 
with the first interval 9:30-10:00 A.M. and the last interval 
3:30-4:00 P.M.. Price volatility due to private information 
revealed from trades for each of the 100 sample firms in each 
of the 13 intervals is estimated as X2ctz2, where X is the 
adverse selection component of the effective spread and ctz2 is 
the variance of zt. The mean of the 100 estimates in each 





THE INTRADAY PATTERN IN PRICE VOLATILITY DUE TO PRICES 
BOUNCING BETWEEN THE BID-ASK SPREAD
The trading day is divided into 13 thirty-minute intervals 
with the first interval 9:30-10:00 A.M. and the last interval 
3:30-4:00 P.M.. Price volatility due to prices bouncing 
between the bid-ask spread for each of the 100 sample firms 
in each of the 13 intervals is estimated as j82crz2, where is 
the gross profit component of the effective spread and crz2 is 
the variance of z,. The mean of the 100 estimates in each 
interval is depicted in the figure and reported in Table 3-4.
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generate profits, the pattern is consistent with the 
hypothesis of the specialist averaging profits over time. 
Furthermore, although the bid-ask spread exhibits a U-shaped 
intraday pattern, the price volatility due to the bid-ask 
spread does not show a U-shaped pattern.
3.6. Conclusions
This paper examines intraday patterns in gross profits 
earned by NYSE specialists. Based on Glosten's (1989) 
hypothesis of specialists' averaging profits over time, we 
argue that the pattern in gross profits should be inversely 
related to the pattern in information asymmetry. The 
intraday pattern in information asymmetry is found to be 
higher at the beginning than during the rest of the trading 
day. This pattern is consistent with Foster and
Viswanathan's (1993) and Hasbrouck's (1990a) findings. 
Conversely, gross profits earned by the specialist are lower 
at the beginning than during the rest of the trading day. 
The evidence supports the hypothesis that the specialist 
reduces information asymmetry in early hours of trading and 
makes subsequent trades more profitable.
Our analysis does not attempt to answer the question of 
what may cause the U-shaped patterns in trading volume and 
price volatility. Nevertheless, our results imply that 
private information is not the cause of high trading volume 
and high price volatility at the end of the trading day.
Furthermore, although the bid-ask spread exhibits a U-shaped 
pattern, we find that the price volatility due to prices 
bouncing between the bid-ask spread does not have a U-shaped 
pattern. As suggested by Brock and Kleidon (1990), the 
puzzle of the U-shaped patterns in market microstructure may 
be related to exogenous demand. Further research in this 
area is certainly warranted.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this dissertation, we examine the strategic behavior 
of the specialist proposed by Glosten (1989) and its 
implications for price volatility and market liquidity. To 
conclude this study, we provide a brief summary of the 
findings and suggest several issues for further research.
The extant literature suggests that the bid-ask spread 
is responsible, at least in part, for the greater volatility 
and more negative autocorrelation at the open than at the 
close. We find that these phenomena are not related to the 
bid-ask spread, but related to pricing errors quoted by the 
specialist or by limit order traders around the open. We use 
George, Kaul, and Nimalendran's (1991) model, which is less 
biased than Roll's (1984) model, to estimate the implied 
spread. The results show that, on average, the implied 
spread earned by liquidity suppliers is less at the open than 
at the close. These results refute Stoll and Whaley's (1990) 
contention that the specialist exploits his monopoly position 
and earns a higher profit at the opening call.
Glosten (1989) posits that when information asymmetry is 
high, the specialist may reduce profits or even realize 
losses to induce informed traders to trade and to release 
their information. This reduces the adverse selection 
problem and makes subsequent trades more profitable. This
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hypothesis of averaging profits through time implies that the 
pattern in the specialist's gross profits is inversely 
related to the pattern in information asymmetry. Since 
information asymmetry has been found to be higher at the 
beginning of the trading day, we predict that gross profits 
earned by the specialist will be lower at the beginning than 
during the rest of the trading day. Empirical results are 
consistent with this hypothesis.
For future research, this dissertation can be extended 
in several directions. First, in Chapter 2, we suggest that 
the larger return volatility and pricing reversal at the open 
may reflect pricing errors quoted by suppliers of liquidity. 
Posted quotes can be from- the quotation of the specialist or 
the public limit order book. Future research may examine 
whether pricing errors at the open come from the specialist 
or limit order traders. Second, future study may examine the 
opening price behavior on the OTC market. Unlike the NYSE 
specialist, the dealers on the OTC quote competitive quoted 
prices to elicit the order flow at the open. Whether the 
competitive multiple-dealership system may provide an 
efficient value discovery process for the opening transaction 
would be an interesting issue. Furthermore, Glosten (1989) 
suggests that competition restricts market makers' ability to 
average gross profits over time. Hence, it is expected that 
there is no clear intraday pattern in gross profits earned by 
OTC market makers.
Third, Morse and Ushman (1983) and Venkatesh and Chiang 
(1986) examine the bid-ask spread around information releases 
and find no difference in the size of the spread. The 
hypothesized strategic behavior of the specialist implies 
that gross profits earned by the specialist is inversely 
related to the degree of information asymmetry. When the 
degree of information asymmetry increases, the specialist may 
charge lower profits to encourage trading, and hence, the 
size of the spread may not increase with the degree of 
information asymmetry. Hence, the same size of the bid-ask 
spread does not necessarily mean no change in asymmetry 
information around information releases. To examine whether 
the degree of information asymmetry increases prior to the 
releases of new information, it is more appropriate to 
investigate the components of the bid-ask spread, instead of 
the spread itself.
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